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I. INTRODUCTION
Timmy has been in the foster care system since he was born.
His mother, an addicted drug user, disappeared soon after his birth.
As a result of his mother's drug abuse, Timmy needed serious medical treatment when he was born. Such treatment would last for a
number of years.
Because neither Timmy's mother nor any relatives could be
found to care for Timmy, he was placed in the custody of Social
Services. He was placed with his first foster family a few days after
he was born. Although that family was instructed regarding the medical care that Timmy needed, they did not fully understand the extent
of care required. In part because of his sickness, and in part because
of Timmy's incessant crying due to his sickness, that foster family
asked Social Services to take him out of their home.
Since no foster care placement was immediately available,
Timmy was placed in institutional care, where he stayed for a few
months until his second foster family became available. Timmy lived
with his second foster family for almost a year. However, Social
Services had to remove him from that family because Timmy showed
signs of physical abuse. The decertification of that family as a foster
family soon followed; in the meantime, Timmy was thrust back into
the uncertainty of the foster care system.
Timmy's third placement was with an emergency foster care
family to care for him temporarily. By now, Tinmy was almost two
years old. Because of the inadequate care that Timmy had received,
he showed indications of slow physical and mental development.
However, Timmy's prognosis started to improve as soon as he began
to live with his third foster family. Timmy's foster family fell in love
with him almost immediately. They nursed him and gave him all the
care he required. Contrary to early medical opinions concerning
Timmy's future, under the supervision of his foster parents, Timmy's
medical condition flourished. In addition, he established strong emotional bonds with his foster parents and their two older children.
Timmy was welcomed as a new member of the family. He was happy and well-adjusted. Within a relatively short period of time,
Timmy's problems were nearly overcome; his physical and mental
development was on target for a child his age.
By the time Timmy celebrated his fourth birthday, his foster
family wanted to adopt him. They treated him like one of their own
and could not bear the thought of Timmy not being a part of their
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family. When they approached Social Services about their intentions,
they were shocked. Timmy's foster family was told that Social Services was looking for a different adoptive family for Timmy. They
urged Social Services to consider them as an adoptive family but
Social Services refused. "Why?" Timmy's foster parents asked. "Because your family is white and Timmy is Black,"' the Social Services worker responded. Discouraged but not disheartened, Timmy's
foster family decided to challenge Social Services' determination.

Despite a long battle, Timmy was ultimately removed from his foster
family. He was almost five years old and had been with his foster
family for almost three years when he was removed. Subsequently,
Timmy was placed with a Black family who eventually adopted him.
Timmy suffered emotionally for a long time after being torn

away from the only parents that had ever properly cared for him and
had given him the love he needed to flourish. Hopefully, Timmy's
adoptive family provided the same care for him. However, it seems
unclear why Timmy ever had to suffer this emotional trauma. Stories
like this provoke a feeling in most of us that something went wrong.
It is troubling that this child was deprived of a family who cared for

him during his worst times and wanted to see him through life with
the same care and attention. Timmy's story is fictitious; however, this
example has attempted to recreate the life of some child out there

who has suffered through just such an experience.
Every day, Black children2 wait in the foster care system for

1. For the purposes of this Note, African-Americans will be referred to as Blacks and
Caucasians as whites. For similar usage see Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (capitalizing Black because it refers to a specific cultural group).
2. The center of the controversy over transracial adoptions has focused on the adoption
of Black children by white adoptive parents. Thus, the central focus of this Note will concern
those adoptions. Also included within the group of Black children are biracial children, children born to one Black parent and one white parent. Despite the fact that these children are
mixed-race, courts and adoption agencies consider these children Black for placement purposes. For a discussion of the special concerns regarding the adoption of biracial children see
infra part H.C; see also Kim Forde-Mazrni, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The
Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MtCH. L. REV. 925, 955-59 (1994).
Although there has been much debate about the placement of Native American children with white parents, that debate is outside the scope of this Note because there is already a Federal statute which gives Indian tribes preference in adopting Indian children. See
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988). For a discussion of the
issues surrounding the Indian Child Welfare Act, see generally Joan H. Hollinger, Beyond the
Best Interests of the Tribe: The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DEr. L. REv. 451 (1989); Roger A. Tellinghuisen, The Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978: A Practical Guide With [Limited) Commentary, 34 S.D. L. REV. 660 (1989); Patrice
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years before being adopted, whether they are temporarily in a foster
care home or in an institutional setting. If these children were white,
they would be placed with an adoptive family within a substantially
shorter time period However, simply because they are Black, these
children are often forced to languish in the foster care system for
years before even the possibility of being adopted arises, if it ever
does. Forcing these children to remain in foster care decreases their
chances of ever being adopted, because the older a child gets, the
harder it will be to find an adoptive placement for the child.' However, the agencies consider race to be such an important factor that
they are willing to take the chance that these children will never have
a permanent home. Clearly, these race matching policies discriminate
against Black children in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
simply because of the color of their skin.' There are numerous white
families who would like to adopt these children, but unfortunately
they are denied the right to do so by agencies which would prefer to
see these children shuffled from foster home to foster home, or institution to institution, rather than permit a transracial adoption. Because
of these policies, the number of transracial adoptions remains relatively low today6 even though Black children wait in foster care and
white families wait to adopt children.
As a result of true stories similar to Timmy's, and the overwhelming figures showing that Black children are disproportionately
represented in the foster care system, the debate over transracial adoption has been highly publicized in newspapers,7 magazines8 and on
Kunesh-Hartman, Comment, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Protecting Essential Tribal Interests, 60 U. CoLO. L. REV. 131 (1989); Michelle L. Lehmann, Comment, The Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978: Does it Apply to The Adoption of an Illegitimate Indian Child?,
38 CATH. U. L. REv. 511 (1989).
3. See infra part HI.D.
4. ELZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMmY BONDS 112 (1993).
5. See infra part III.B.

6. For example, in 1992 only about eleven percent of the adoptions in Missouri and
only about seven percent in Illinois were transracial. Robert L. Koenig, Senate Votes to Ease
Cross-Race Adoptions, ST. LotuiS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 30, 1994, at 3A. In the year ending
June 30, 1993, in Illinois, only sixty-eight of 1,059 adoptions (or little more than six percent)
involved transracial adoptions. The Racial Divide in Adoption, CHI. TRI., Jan. 3, 1994, at

N1O (unsigned editorial).
7. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Kids Need Parents--of Any Race, WAl. ST. J., Nov. 9,

1993, at A18; Lynn Smith, Those are your Parents? What Happened, L.A. TMES, Nov. 3,
1993, at E3.
8. See, e.g., Barbara Bisantz Raymond & Judy Turner, The Color of Love, REDHOOK,
Aug. 1992, at 140; Steven Waldman & Lincoln Caplan, The Politics of Adoption, NEwsWEEK, Mar. 21, 1994, at 64.
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news broadcasts. The debate even reached Congress last year when
Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Senator Carol Moseley-Braun proposed the Multiethnic Placement Act9 to eliminate bias against
transracial adoptions. The focus of the controversy is whether adoptive parents of one race can rear a child of another race and still
provide that child with a sense of that child's ethnic and cultural
heritage." Despite numerous studies which show that transracially
adopted children develop a sound racial identity and frequently
emerge with unique advantages, the debate continues. Meanwhile, as
the debate rages on, Black children are denied adoptive homes. Further complicating the issue is that, in most cases, these children do
not have a choice between a Black home or a white home; rather, the
choice is one between a white home or no home at all.

The purpose of this Note is to explore transracial adoptions that
take place through the foster care system1 ' and the effect that the

Multiethnic Placement Act, if enacted by Congress, will have on
those adoptions. In doing so, this Note will show that the agencies
that make adoption placements discriminate against Black children
because of their race, a practice prohibited by the United States Constitution, and that the Act, as proposed, will have little effect in

changing that practice. Part II traces the history of transracial adoption and the controversy surrounding it. It will show how the histori-

9. S. 1224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
10. Race also plays a factor in other child placement contexts-for example, when a
non-custodial parent sues to regain custody after the custodial parent marries a spouse of
another race, as in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), or when parents of different
races divorce and both seek custody of their biracial children. Those placements, however, are
outside the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the use of race in
those placements see Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and
The Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 60-69 (1990-1991); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 2, at
930-32, 934-36.
11. Transracial adoptions can take place in two different contexts. The first is where a
white foster family has had custody of a Black foster child for a period of time and decides
that it wants to adopt the child. The second is where a white family and a Black family are
competing to adopt a Black child and neither family has had any past relationship with the
child. Although I believe that the latter situation may occur, there are no cases that present
such a situation. In fact, in her article, Professor Perry distinguishes between these two types
of adoptions, yet never cites a case involving the latter situation. See generally Perry, supra
note 10, at 109-23 (arguing that race should not be a factor where adoption entails removing
the child from foster parents who want to adopt the child, but that race should be given
substantial weight where there is more than one family available to adopt the child). But see
Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in
Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163, 1248-54 (1991) (arguing that even in a case where there
are both Black and white adoptive parents available to adopt a child, race should not be
allowed to play a role in the decision).
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cal policies of matching children to their adoptive parents continue
today and how these policies cause Black children to remain without

adoptive parents for a substantially longer period of time than white
children. Part III will explore the role that race currently plays in
adoption decisions. It first examines the state statutes that have been
adopted to give preference to same race placements, and second,
those that have been adopted to prevent such discrimination in place-

ments. Next, it examines the cases and demonstrates that race is not
an appropriate consideration when determining the "best interests of

the child." Part IV will explore the different versions of the Multiethnic Placement Act, a bill that has been proposed in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, in different forms, to combat
discrimination in the placement of children for adoption or for foster care. This Note maintains that the bill, in either of its current
forms, is insufficient to combat the racism that continues to occur in
these placements-in most cases, with some sort of state support,
whether by statute or by written 3 or unwritten policy 4 of the agencies. Finally, this Note will suggest alternatives to the Act which has

denied Black children equal protection under the law. These alterna-

12. Although this Note will focus on the adoption of Black children by white parents,
as discussed supra note 2, the bills proposed in Congress will apply to any discrimination on
the basis of "race, color, and national origin." See infra part IV.
13. These policies are usually written out as guidelines for the social workers to follow
in finding placements for children, whether for foster care or for adoption. For example, in
LH.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989), at issue was Guideline No. 3 of the
"Guidelines for Placement Resources Selection" set out by the Missouri Division of Family
Services. Guideline No. 3 provided that one issue to be considered in selecting a foster home
is "[t]he ability of the foster family to preserve the child's racial, cultural, ethnic, and religious heritage. In most cases, every attempt must be made to match the child with a foster
family with the same racial, cultural, ethnic, and religious background." Id. at 243.
14. Because of concerns on the agency's behalf about the constitutionality of using race
in making adoption placements, it is sometimes difficult to determine that an agency has a
policy against transracial adoption because the policy remains unwritten. For example, despite
the fact that neither Missouri nor Illinois have formal policies (as they did ten years ago) of
waiting six months before allowing a transracial adoption, adoption experts in both states
sometimes delay a child's adoption in an effort to find an adoptive family of the same race
as the child. Koenig, supra note 6, at 3A. It is clear that these states still have these policies
if such practices continue, however, they now keep these policies hidden. For a general discussion of the unwritten policies of the adoption agencies that delay or deny the placement
of Black children with white parents, see Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1183-88. After having
conducted interviews with leaders in the adoption world and experts on race matching policies, together with having reviewed the literature in the field, Bartholet asserts that "it is the
unwritten and generally invisible rules that are central to understanding the nature of current
policies . . . . The rules generally make race not simply 'a factor,' but an overwhelmingly
important factor in the placement process." Id. at 1188.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol22/iss4/18

6

Mini: Breaking Down the Barriers to Transracial Adoptions: Can the Mult
BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS

tives would effectively eliminate the racism that occurs in these placement decisions. This Note concludes that the bill, as currently proposed, will have no effect on the state statutes because it provides

that race may be a factor, but not the sole factor, in placement decisions; the same standard which has produced the racism in the foster
care and adoption systems that exists today.
If. TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION BACKGROUND
A. History of TransracialAdoption
The primary focus of the debate over transracial adoption concems the adoption of Black children by white families. Time after
time, cases arise where a white foster family, despite having raised a
Black foster child for years and now wanting to adopt the child, must
fight dearly to hold onto the child, sometimes successfully, 5 and
sometimes not. 6 These battles are the product of the historical development of transracial adoptions in this country. However, the history of transracial adoptions cannot be considered in a test tube; it
must be considered in the context of the history of adoptions general-

ly.
The adoption of white children began through a formal system.
The system was originally designed to find white children for infertile
white parents. At that time, -there was a strong policy of matching
the child with the prospective adoptive parents. This meant that adoption agencies aimed to match adoptive parents with a child who
closely resembled them. They looked for characteristics ranging from
similar physical characteristics" to similar social status and intelli-

15. See, e.g., Raymond & Turner, supra note 8, at 140 (detailing the story of how
Turner's white family fought to keep their Black foster son and eventually were able to do
so).
16. See, e.g., In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992); see also Karen Grigsby Bates,
Are You My Mother?, ESSENcE, Apr. 1991, at 49 (describing the story of a white foster
mother who wanted to adopt a Black foster child who suffered from medical and developmental disabilities but was denied that request and had the child removed from her care only
to be placed in an institutional setting); Michael D'Antonio, Sad Goodbye to Michael: White
Foster Parents Must Surrender Black Infant, NEWSDAY, Apr. 1, 1988, at 3 (describing the
story of a white foster family who had their Black eight-month-old foster child removed from
their care after they were rejected as adoptive parents because of their race and noting that
four other families in the same program had similar complaints).
17. See Zanita E. Fenton, In a World Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children,
10 HARv. BLAcKLEirrmR J. 39, 41 (1993).
18. Adoption agencies would consider such factors as age, hair color, eye color and
facial features of the prospective adoptive parents and child and would only place a child
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gence when placing children. 9 The agencies were motivated by their
belief that the adoptive parents and the adopted child would adjust
more easily to becoming a family if the child was placed with parents
who actually could have parented him." Race matching was simply
a logical outgrowth of this policy. 1
Moreover, adoptions were often "hidden." This meant that the
adopted child often was not told that he was adopted and if he was
told, it was not until he was an adult. An adopted child received a
new birth certificate listing the adoptive mother as the biological
mother so as to hide the fact that a different biological mother ever
existed.2 The original birth certificate was placed in a sealed file to
prevent any reconnection with the past.' This notion of secrecy was
more easily maintained by having parents who looked like the child.
It was easier for the child to believe that his adoptive parents were
actually his biological parents if they all looked the same. As a result,
transracial adoptions were not considered.' Transracial adoptions did
not serve the purpose of creating a biological family where one did
not exist nor did it permit adoptive parents to keep the fact of adoption a secret from the child.
By contrast, the adoption of Black children began less formally.
During slavery, black families were often fragmented by slave owners.' Because of this practice, Black children were often left
parentless. However, children often found fictive "aunts and uncles"
in other locations to act as parents for them.' These extended families cared for the children and often explained their separation from

with parents who had similar physical characteristics. Id. at 42 n.19.
19. BARTHOLET, supra note 4, at 49 (stating that although these matching policies have

significantly given way to reality today, they are still "very much alive with respect to
race").
20. See Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1977).
21. For example, the 1958 Standards for Adoption Service of the Child Welfare League
provided that "'children placed in adoptive families with similar racial characteristics, such as

color, can become more easily integrated into the average family group and community."'
Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1176 n.15 (citing CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE § 4.6 (1958)).
22. BARTHOLET, supra note 4, at 54.
23. Id. This practice of issuing a new birth certificate and placing the original birth

certificate in a sealed file continues today. Id.
24. In fact, some states actually prohibited such adoptions. See infra notes 30-31 and

accompanying text.
25. See Fenton, supra note 17, at 42.
26. See IU.
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their parents to them. Thus, there was no secrecy in the informal
adoption of Black children."
This informal approach to caring for Black children continues in
the Black community today. The Black extended family functions as
an informal adoptive family for Black children in need of care.' In
fact, the adoption rate amongst Black families may be underestimated
because Black families often take in children of their kin and care for
them for their lives without ever formally adopting the children.29
Historically, not only were transracial adoptions not considered,
they were actually prohibited by statute either by allowing a person to
adopt only a child of the same race3 ' or by affirmatively prohibiting
such an adoption.3 These statutes were eventually struck down as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 2 However, the prohibitions existed until the 1960s and 1970s when the
barriers to transracial adoptions began to breakdown. 3 The first ma27. See id.
28. James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAm. L. 487,
491 (1987-1988).
29. Fenton, supra note 17, at 45.
30. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 (West 1965) (providing that "[a] single person over
the age of twenty-one years, or a married couple jointly, may petition to adopt any child of
his or their race"). The statute has since been amended to provide that a person may adopt
"a child" and not only a "child of his or their race." See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422
(West 1991).
31. TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 46a (West 1959) (providing that "[n]o white child
can be adopted by a negro person, nor can a negro child be adopted by a white person").
The term negro as defined by the Texas miscegenation statute also included biracial persons.
It included within the term negro "a person of mixed blood descended from negro ancestry
from the third generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation may have been a
white person." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 493 (West 1959).
32. See Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (holding that the
Louisiana adoption statute permitting only same race adoptions violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656, 659 (rex. Civ. App. 1967) (holding that the Texas statute prohibiting adoption of a negro child by a white person or of a
white child by a negro person violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution).
33. Commentators point to a number of factors that led to the increase in transracial
adoptions during this period. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of
the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 503, 505-16 (1964). Professor Howard
lists seven factors that led to this increase: (1) the identification of the battered child syndrome caused the number of children coming into the placement system to increase, id. at
505; (2) the inadequacy of the foster care system to care for children became apparent, id. at
505-06; (3) the results of the developmental effects of maternal deprivation that were caused
by institutional care were reported, id. at 506-09; (4) the number of white infants for adoption decreased, id. at 509-10; (5) the decline in social workers following race matching adoption policies, id. at 510-13; (6) the number of minority families available to adopt minority
children was insufficient, id. at 513-14; (7) the willingness of families to adopt transracially
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jor step toward opening up the adoption world to transracial adoptions
was an increase in the adoption of Asian children after the Korean
and Vietnam Wars. Another major step was the advent of the civil
rights movement which brought about a change in the policies against
transracial adoption. With the goal of increasing racial integration,
transracial adoptions became more acceptable. Some people sought to
adopt Black children as part of their commitment to integrating the
races. Others sought to adopt Black children as a way of helping
children who needed families. By 1971, transracial adoptions of Black
children by white adoptive families had peaked at 2,574.'
Then in 1972, the National Association of Black Social Workers
("NABSW") handed down their position paper on transracial adoption." Terming transracial adoption as a "form of genocide," their
position paper had a strong psychological effect.36 In this period of
racial integration, no one wanted to be accused of committing cultural
genocide against the Black race. Moreover, their position was consistent with the traditional policies of matching children to adoptive
families with similar characteristics. 7 Thus, their position had an
immediate impact on reducing the number of placements of Black
children with white parents." The debate about the controversial position taken by this small but influential group continues today. The
NABSW's position reflects the racism that has caused the separation

due to the change in social attitudes about racial integration, itL at 514-16.
34. See Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1180.
35. The NABSW position, in part, was as follows:
Black children should be placed only with Black families whether in foster
care or for adoption. Black children belong, physically, psychologically and culturally in Black families in order that they receive the total sense of themselves and
develop a sound projection of their future. Human beings are products of their
environment and develop their sense of values, attitudes and self concept within
their family structures. Black children in White homes are cut off from the healthy
development of themselves as Black people ....
We the participants of the workshop have committed ourselves to go back
to our communities and work to end this particular form of genocide.
National Association of Black Social Workers, Position Paper (April 1972), reprinted in RrrA
J. SIMON & HowARD ALTSTmIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (1977) (emphasis added).
36. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. ILL L. REV. 1,

25-26 (1992).
37. BARTHOLET, supra note 4, at 111 (stating that "[t]he NABSW leadership's attack on
transracial adoption met with relatively ready acceptance from white social workers not just
because of liberal white guilt, but because it fit with the traditional assumptions of their
professional world").
38. By 1975, the number of transracial adoptions had fallen to 831. Bartholet, supra
note 11, at 1180.
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of the races in this country and it fosters the continuance of such
separatism. 9 In place of the old opposition to race mixing that was
supported by whites, this new opposition to racial integration is supported by Black groups, such as the NABSW, which support race

matching. 4
Of course, the NABSW has taken an extreme position and even
those who oppose transracial adoption may disagree with the
NABSW's position in some circumstances.41 For example, a director
of the One Church, One Child Program, an organization which recruits Black adoptive parents,42 recalled one situation where the
NABSW's insistence upon race matching went too far.43 She tried to
place three Black siblings, ages six, seven, and nine, with white adoptive parents. The adoptive parents already had adopted one Black

child with Down's Syndrome, two Korean children, and two
Salvadorean children, one of whom was half Black. The social workers vetoed the idea, even though a sibling group of three children,

none of whom are very young, would be the hardest group to place,
especially together. She stated, "I recruit black families for black

children.... This would have been an excellent placement for these
three children and it was turned down because the family was Caucasian ....
These children were kept from having a home....
Agencies and social workers have to change their ways of thinking.""

39. See Peter Finn, Racism, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 21, 1993, at B7 (stating that "[tihe
attitudes of the adoption agencies and the black leadership that opposes transracial adoptions
need to be examined for what they really are-racism").
40. Ellen Goodman, In the effort to racially match in adoptions, the children can be the
losers, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 1993, at 77.
41. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 10. The author states that
[t]o the extent that the NABSW would support keeping a child in an institution
when a permanent home is available, or would support removal of a child from a
home where she has formed strong bonds with her caretakers to place her in a
home with adults of the same race, the position of that organization is too extreme.
Id. at 113.
42. For a discussion of organizations recruiting Black adoptive parents, see infra part
II.F.2.
43. Charles A. Radin, Waiting For a Home Opposition to Transracial Adoption Slows
Black Placements, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1989, at Metro 1 (interviewing Jean Tates, director of the One Church, One Child Program in Cambridge).
44. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 18

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:897

B. Reactions to TransracialAdoption Today

Largely due to the NABSW's position, today there is a consensus among agencies that a child should be placed with a same race
family unless no such family is available, in which case, the child

can be placed with a family of a different race.45 For example, the
Massachusetts Department of Social Services has a policy of searching vigorously for a matching-race adoptive family, but at some point
if a Black adoptive family has not been found, then the child will be

placed with a white adoptive family.' However, it is unclear how
long an agency will wait until it decides that a Black adoptive family
cannot be found. What is clear is that the average time spent in foster

care in Massachusetts is about two years.47 These policies are used

by agencies to keep Black children out of white adoptive families
even when there are no Black families available to adopt them. There
are no laws requiring the agencies to make an adoption placement

within a certain period of time; thus an agency can take as long as it
wants to make a different race placement. In the meantime, however,

a child suffers.
One of the NABSW's reasons for opposing transracial adoption
is the contention that a Black child who grows up in a white family
will have a difficult time establishing a sense of racial identity.'

45. Lynne Duke, Couples Challenging Same-Race Adoption Policies, WASH. POST, Apr.
5, 1992, at Al, A6 (quoting Mary Beth Seader of the National Committee for Adoption that
the organization's "'position is first you look for a matching-race family[,] [i]f you can't find
a matching-race family, do not delay placements"').
46. Radin, supra note. 43 (interviewing Janet Eustis, Deputy Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Social Services).
47. Id.
48. Identity has been defined as having
three components: (1) a sense of 'belonging' in a stable family and community;
(2) a feeling of self-esteem and confidence; and (3) 'survival skills' that enable the
child to cope with the world outside the family. One's sense of identity, therefore,
includes perceptions of oneself as both an individual and a social being.
In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 787 (D.C. 1982) (citing J. LADNER, MIXED FAMUIES:
ADOPTING AcRoss RACIAL BOUNDARIES 284 (1977)).
Racial identity, however, has been described as a theory of development. The psychological theory of racial identity involves four stages of development. Lena Williams, In a
90's Quest for Black Identity, Intense Doubts and Disagreement, N.Y. T1im, Nov. 30, 1991,
at Al, A26 (discussing the theory promulgated by William Cross in 1978). The four stages
evolve as follows:
In the first stage, the individual attempts to deny membership in a race.
Then an experience challenges this individual's anti-black attitudes, causing psychological and emotional turmoil.
Attempts to resolve the conflict are made in the third stage, when a person
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They argue that because some transracial adoptees do not identify
themselves first as being Black,49 they have not developed a sense of
Black identity." However, empirical studies that have been conducted on transracial adoptees5" tend to show just the opposite; they
show that transracial adoptees are comfortable with their racial identity5 2 In fact, studies show that transracial adoptees are as well adjusted as any other adopted children. 3 Studies assessing adjustment in
terms of achievement, self-esteem, and behavioral problems show that
transracial adoptees are doing well.' In fact, one of the major differences between transracial adoptees and other Black children is that
transracial adoptees are more comfortable in their relations with

discovers his or her cultural heritage. The person may develop new, idealized images and intense emotions about being black, and feel hostile toward whites. In the
fourth stage, the person assumes a positive black identity and begins to accept a
bicultural identity.
Id. It does not seem clear from this psychological theory why Black children who grow up
with white adoptive parents would have a difficult time developing a Black identity. In fact,
it almost seems as if Black children raised by white parents would be in the optimum
situation for evolving through the four stages outlined above.
For example, many opponents of transracial adoption argue that Black children raised
with white adoptive parents will have anti-Black attitudes because they have been raised in a
white family, in a white neighborhood, in a white school, and in a white church. They also
argue that these children will not be prepared to handle racism that they will encounter as
they grow into their teenage years or beyond. Supposedly, they will not have been taught
"survival skills" by their parents because their white adoptive parents never had to face such
racism. However, the opponents of transracial adoption fail to consider that in accordance
with the psychological theory ofilracial identity, the experience of encountering racism might
be the perfect situation to challenge these children's anti-Black attitudes. Because of the
internal conflict that they will encounter, they will come to see themselves as Black and
resolve such conflicts from having been brought up by white adoptive parents. In the end,
these children should be able to identify themselves as Black and with the bicultural society
in which they were reared.
49. Studies of transracial adoptees show that "[tihey think race is not the most important factor in defining who they are or who their friends should be. They often describe
themselves as biracial or American or 'human' rather than black." BARTHOLEr, supra note 4,
at 103.
50. "'When a black kid says, 'I consider myself a human being,' that's cultural genocide. Anytime a person denies what he or she is, their race has lost one individual."' Helene
Lorber, Children of Two Worlds: Cross-Racial Adoptions Aren't New, DETROIT FREE PREss,
Sept. 30, 1990, at 1G (quoting Robbie Littles, past national vice president of the NABSW).
51. For a detailed discussion of the numerous studies that have been conducted on
transracial adoptees see Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1207-26.
52. RrrA SiMoN & HowARD ALTSTEN, TRANSRACIAL ADo'raES AND THEmR FAMMS
28 (1987) (finding that transracial adoptees were "aware of and comfortable with the racial
identity imposed on them by their outward appearance").
53. Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1208 n.120.
54. Id. at 1209.
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whites and with living a racially integrated life.55 Equally important,
these studies show that transracial adoption has had an impact on the
white members of these biracial families; the parents say they have
"developed a new awareness of racial issues and describe their lives
as significantly enriched by the experience" and the white children in
these families seem to be free of racial biases and dedicated to the
"vision of a pluralistic, multicolored world in which a person's humanity is more important than his race."56 Analogously, even though
opponents of transracial adoption argue that placement with a family
of the same race is "a benefit of overriding importance to black children ....

[t]here is no evidence that same-race placement is bene-

ficial to black children. 57
Contrary to the opinion taken by the NABSW, the position taken
by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
("NAACP") reflects these positive studies. Their position is that:
If there are black families available and suitable under the criteria
of advancing the "best interest of the child," black children should
be placed with such black families.
If black families are not available for placement of black children,
transracial adoption ought to be pursued as a viable and preferred
alternative to keeping such children in foster homes.58
The NAACP's position recognizes that there are not always Black
families available to adopt a Black child and even in some cases
where there are Black families, 'placement with those Black families
may not be in the best interests of the child. In those circumstances,
it recognizes that agencies should seek out white families so that
these children can have permanent homes rather than languish in the
foster care system. It encompasses both the notion that same race
placements, where the placement is in the best interests of the child,
should be the first alternative for a child and the notion that

55. BARTHOLET, supra note 4, at 103.

56. Id. at 105.
57. Id. at 110 (stating that "the argument for racial matching policies rests on the un-

supported assumption that black children will be significantly better off with 'their own
kind").
58. Memorandum from Benjamin L. Hooks, Executive Director, National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People to all NAACP Units, National Board Members and
NAACP/SCF Trustees 7 (June 3, 1992), reprinted in Rebecca L. Koch, Note, Transracial

Adoption in Light of the Foster Care Crisis: A Horse of a Different Color, 10 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HuM. RTs. 147, 176 n.226 (1992).
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transracial placements should be an alternative for a child where no
such placement exists. It recognizes that a home with a white family
is better than no home at all, and thereby diverges significantly from
the position taken by the NABSW. The NABSW, on the other hand,
"'steadfastly holds to the position that Black children should not be
placed with white parents under any circumstances."'' 9
In support of the position to place Black children with white
families when there are no Black families available for adoption,
studies which have been conducted on the emotional bonding of
children show that children adapt best when placed with one family
as early as possible.' It is clear from these studies that disruption in
the stability of a child's family life where the child has established
bonds with a psychological parent61 is damaging to the child. Under
the psychological parent theory, a child requires early stable attachments for normal development. Where there are frequent changes in
the parent figure or other harmful interruptions, the child's ability to
develop physically, emotionally, and mentally is lessened.62 Despite
the fact that psychological bonding is a significant factor in a child's
development, courts de-emphasize its importance by regarding it as
merely one factor, among many, in determining the best interests of
the child.63 Because of this de-emphasis, agencies and courts risk
jeopardizing the child's stability and security by authorizing the
movement of the child from placement to placement.'
In McLaughlin v. Pernsley,' one can see how the psychological
parent theory is affected by transracial adoption cases. The facts are

59. BARTHOLeT, supra note 4, at 97.
60. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN Er Al.., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHID (1973).
61. Psychological parent has been defined as "one who, on a continuing, day-to-day
basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs. The psychological parent
may be a biological . . . adoptive, foster, or common-law . . . parent or any other person."

Id. at 98.
62. Id. at 18.
63. See, e.g., Miller v. Berks County Children and Youth Serv., 465 A.2d 614, 630 (Pa.

1983).
64. GOLDSTEIN Er AL, supra note 60, at 42-44.
The procedures of child placement are not designed to assure a prompt
final decision. The process is characterized by extended periods of uncertainty
caused by overcautious and overworked administrative agencies; by courts with
overcrowded dockets, extended and oft-postponed hearings; and by judges who are
inclined to procrastinate before rendering their decisions at trial or on appeal.

Id.at 43.
65. 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989).
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as follows. When Raymond, a Black child, was four months old, he
was placed in the temporary care of the McLaughlins, white foster
parents.' An agency document stated that Raymond had to be
placed in a white home because it was the only infant home available.67 After Raymond had lived with the McLaughlins for two
years, Black foster parents, the Williamses, became available as foster
parents. The agency decided to remove Raymond from the care of the
McLaughlins and place him in the care of the Williamses. Although
foster care regulations required the agency to advise the McLaughlins
of their right to appeal the removal decision, the agency failed to do
SO.

The McLaughlins then brought an action in the family court
seeking the return of Raymond. The family court denied the
McLaughlins' motion but the McLaughlins filed exceptions to the
court's order. Thereafter, the McLaughlins agreed to an indefinite extension of time for the agency to respond to their exceptions and
further agreed with the agency that a psychiatric evaluation might
resolve the need for litigation. A psychiatrist chosen by the agency
from a list presented by the McLaughlins recommended that Raymond
be returned to the McLaughlins.
The agency did not respond to the psychiatrist's recommendations and the McLaughlins brought this action in federal court. The
McLaughlins and the agency again agreed to try to resolve this dispute through a psychiatric evaluation.' This time, however, the
agency appointed a three-psychiatrist panel. The panel noted that
Raymond had been suffering from depression due to his removal
from the McLaughlins.' Their report recommended that the
Williamses return Raymond to the McLaughlins. 0 By this time,
however, Raymond had been with the Williamses for more than one
year and eight months. Eventually Raymond was returned to the care
of the McLaughlins, but not before the changes in his family life had
resulted in severe depression and slurred speech attributable to the
fact that he was removed from his foster parents solely because of a
difference in race between he and his foster parents.7
Rather than viewing transracial adoptions as white families seek66. 876 F.2d at 309-10.
67. Id. at 310,
* 68. Id. at 311.

69. Id. at 316.
70. Id. at 311.
71. Id. at 323.
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ing to raise Black children as whites,7 those who oppose transracial
adoption should view it as white families seeking to help both Black
children in need73 and themselves by completing their families.

White society has not banded together and decided that it can eradicate the Black race by adopting Black children and making them
white.74 Transracial adoption stems from the fact that there are simply too many Black children suffering in the foster care system and

what they need most are permanent families. That is not to say that
Black children are the only ones who benefit from transracial adoptions; white adoptive parents likewise benefit from the love and joy
they receive from their adopted child. They too receive as much

pleasure from the Black child's love as the Black child receives from
her new home. However, there should be no concern that racist white
parents will seek to adopt transracially.' No racist, no matter how
desperate for a child, will adopt a child of a race he despises. 76

72. "The lateral transfer of our children to white families is not in our best inter-

est. . . . It is their aim to raise Black children with white minds . . . ." Forde-Mazrui, supra
note 2, at 961 n.205 (quoting Morris F.X. Jeff, Jr., President's Message, NATL. ASSN. BLACK
Soc. WORKERS NEwSL., Spring 1988, at 1-2).
73. But see Linda van Ekelenburg, Racial Matching, SAN FRANcIScO CHRON., Dec. 15,
1993, at A26 (stating that "a more important reason for ethnic matching in adoption is to
prevent the perception of the black child being rescued by white charity. Unfortunately,
transracial adoption perpetuates the stereotypes of blacks as the social problem and whites as
the solution").
74. It should be clear that transracial adoptive parents are not racists seeking to destroy
the Black race. They do not take Black children into their homes because they hate the
Black race and hope to eradicate it by adopting a Black child. See Fenton, supra note 17, at
52 ("those white people who do seek to adopt Black children are not typically motivated by
a desire to participate in cultural genocide of the Black community"). They are simply concerned and loving parents with room in their hearts for one more child, who have decided
that because of the large number of Black children in need of homes, they want to adopt a
Black child. I do not mean to deny any notions that some white parents adopt Black children simply because there are no white children available. I am sure that this has been the
case for some white parents. However, once those parents decide to consider adopting a
Black child, I believe that thoughts of the numerous Black children waiting for homes play a
large role in their decision to finally seek a Black child for adoption. Remember also that a
large number of white parents seeking to adopt Black children come into that status because
they were the child's foster parents. Thus, although these parents may not have actively
sought out a Black child for adoption, those are their circumstances. In any event, it seems
outrageous to argue that a white family would operate at such cross purposes.
75. But see id. at 61 ('[i]gnoring race in placement decision would create the possibility
of adoption by racist parents who are desperate for a child").
76. Remember, that by adopting a Black child, white parents may voluntarily subject
themselves to racism. Even though white people generally are not subject to racism, Black
children often are. By adopting a Black child, white parents subject themselves to possible
racism either against them, because they are now part of an interracial family, or against
their child, because of their child's skin color. For example, parents who have adopted
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Those who adopt transracially see past the color lines and see a child
who they can love and make a part of their family.
C. Special Placement Situations
The adoption of biracial children presents even more troubling
aspects than the adoption of Black children. Even though adoption by
a white family is considered a transracial adoption for these children,

adoption by a Black family is also a transracial adoption. 7 Many
argue that since society will view biracial children as Black children,78 they should be treated the same as Black children for place-

ment purposes. Although courts and adoption agencies treat biracial
children as Black,79 biracial children are a mix of both races and as
such, should be able to identify with both races.' 0 By placing the
child with one race or the other, one could argue that the child is
being cut off from one half of her cultural heritage, whether it is
Black or white. Thus, there could never be a placement for a biracial
child where the child would not be deprived of a part of her cultural
identity, unless it was with an interracial family.
Even more disturbing than the problems posed for biracial chil-

transracially often tell stories about strange looks that they receive from complete strangers in
stores, restaurants, etc. For possibly the first time in their lives, these parents learn what
racism means and how to handle it for themselves and to teach their children how to effectively handle it. This undertaking by white parents is not something that should be easily
overlooked.
77. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 2, at 955-59.
78. "[I]n today's society, a person who has any black characteristics at all is generally
perceived as black." In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 627 n.11 (Pa. 1983).
79. One article suggests that treating biracial children as Black for placement purposes
may not be the proper approach.
[B]iracial children have a legitimate genetic and psychological claim to both their
black and white heritage. The need for biracial children to identify positively with
Black culture suggests the desirability of placing them with black parents. The
equally legitimate need to identify positively with white culture, however, speaks in
favor of placing biracial children with white parents. Two further considerations
undermine the policy of favoring Black placement for biracial children. Frst, although biracial children are generally viewed as black by society at large, they are
not always accepted as black by black people. Second, placing biracial children
with white parents may afford certain benefits over placing them with Black parents. They are more likely to identify with their mixed heritage rather than as
black alone. In at least this way, the biracial child may accept herself more completely.
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 2, at 959.
80. See id. at 956-57 ("[b]y treating a biracial child as black, the courts decide first,
that the biracial child should identify herself as one and only one race, and second, that this
race should be black").
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dren is the fact that some of those who oppose transracial adoption
only feel that way with regard to healthy Black infants. As for older
Black children or handicapped Black children, they do not feel so
strongly. For example, although Professor Bowen argues that "a Black
child's best interests entail being reared and socialized in the Black
community,""1 he takes a different approach with regard to older
Black children and handicapped Black children. Professor Bowen
states:
for the older Black potential adoptee (proportions are certainly high
in comparison to total Black potential adoptees) and the Black handicapped potential adoptee, any offer by any family to take him or
her should be welcomed, for these children are certainly hard to
place.... Should a white family want to adopt these children, they
should be encouraged; the long-run analysis is that the trauma and
lack of family affection is more devastating than the denial of a
home altogether, Black or white.'
In other words, opponents of transracial adoption recognize that it
would be in the best interests of older Black children and handicapped Black children to be adopted by parents of a different race
than to languish in institutional care for the rest of their lives. 3 In
these special cases, no loving, caring parents should be ruled out
because of their race.' However, they fail to recognize that this is
the same argument put forth by proponents of transracial adoption-that it is in a child's best interest to be placed with a family of
a different race rather than to remain in foster care homes or institutional settings for the rest of her life. Yet, every day, agencies take
the chance that a healthy Black infant will be adopted by Black parents because of her age and medical condition. However, the risk that
even one healthy Black child is not adopted by a Black family is not
worth taking when a caring white family is available to adopt the
child. Furthermore, it is as if these opponents of transracial adoption
are saying that the older and handicapped Black children are not
worth as much to the Black community as healthy Black infants are.
In other words, white society is free to take these special needs chil0

81. Bowen, supra note 28, at 488.
82. Id. at 511.
83. Joseph R. Carrieri, The Foster Child: Bi-Racial Foster Care and Adoptions, in
CRMNAL LAW AND URBAN. PROBLEMS 1989, at 291 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course

Handbook Series No. 151, 1989).
84. Id.
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dren because the Black community is not as concerned about their
identifying with Black culture.' However, the white community
should not even try to adopt healthy Black infants because the Black
community is so concerned about their racial identity that it is willing
to put the good of the Black community ahead of each child's own
best interest.
D. The Problems Black Children Face Today
Due to "escalating rates of child poverty,9 86 "growing numbers
of births to unmarried teens,"' growing numbers of homeless families,88 growing substance abuse, 9 "a ninety percent rise in reports
of abuse and neglect, and now the deadly threat of AIDS,"' families
have been burdened by increasing stress and have placed new demands on the child welfare system, particularly the foster care system.91 The results of these new demands on the system are even

85. In fact, a study by the Packard Foundation found that white families were more
willing than Black families to adopt disabled Black children. Hanna Rosin, Children Without
Choice: Transracial Adoption Taboo Leaves Black Kids Languishing, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWs, Jan. 16, 1994, at 85A. The study found that forty percent of transracially adopted
children were disabled, twenty-three percent had psychological problems and thirty-three percent had been sexually abused. Id.
86. No PLACE TO CALL HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. No. 395,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1990) [hereinafter No PLACE TO CALL HOME] (reporting that one
in five children, thirteen million children, lived in poverty). This, of course, may be affected
by the fact that at that time, nearly one in four children lived in a single parent family. Id.
at 26.
87. Id. The fertility rate for Black females between the ages *of ten and nineteen is
three times that of white females in the same age category. Anita Allen, Legal Rights for
Poor Blacks, in THE UNDERCLASS QUESTION 138 n.67 (Bill E. Lawson ed., 1992).
88. No PLACE TO CALL How, supra note 86, at 28 (reporting that one-third of the
homeless population included families with children).
89. A study of black children in foster care conducted by the National Black Child
Development Institute found that drug abuse by parents contributed to placement for thirty-six
percent of the 1,000 cases studied. Id. at 30. Moreover, substance abuse has caused a dramatic increase in the number of cases involving drug-addicted infants. For example, in Illinois in
1991, there were 1,223 drug-addicted infants in foster care, a 132 percent increase over 1987.
Id. at 36. More startling, in 1991, New York City officials estimated that 2,000 "crack babies" would enter the foster care system in that year alone. Perry Lang, More Children.
Fewer Homes: Crack Feeds Foster-Care Crisis, SAN FRAN. CHRON., May 31, 1991, at Al.
90. No PLACE To CALL HOME, supra note 86, at 25.
91. Although this Note focuses on adoption, it is almost impossible to understand
transracial adoption without at least a cursory review of the problems children face in the
foster care system. A substantial number of adoptions that take place today are by foster
parents. Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1186 n.59, 1193 n.74. As a result, foster parents are
increasingly chosen with the thought of future adoption in mind where it is unlikely that the
child will be returned to his parent(s). Id. at 1186 n.59. Thus, it has become important for
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more disturbing with regard to minority children. Minority children
are disproportionately represented in the foster care system 92 and are

entering the system at a higher rate than white children. 93 There are
not enough foster families to house these children9 which means
that these children will be held in institutional care rather than in a
foster family home.95 Moreover, the median length of stay in foster
care for Black children is one-third longer than the national median.' In particular, Black children are three times more likely to resocial workers to place children with families of the same race in the event that the child
becomes available for adoption and the foster parents want to adopt the child. Id. Consequently, the same race-matching policies that occur in adoption are increasingly taking place
in foster care placements. IL In fact, many of the transracial adoption disputes that occur are
the result of Black children being placed with white foster care parents who later want to
adopt the child. For a discussion of the convergence of these concerns, see generally Michael
P. Kennedy, Comment, In the Best Interests of the Child: Religious and Racial Matching in
Foster Care, 3 GEO. MASON. U. Civ. RTS. U. 299 (1993); Koch, supra note 58.
92. In 1985, minority children comprised forty-one percent of the children in foster care.
That number rose to approximately forty-six percent in 1988, while the proportion of minority
children in the nation was less than half that percentage, approximately nineteen percent. No
PLACE TO CALL HOME, supra note 86, at 38. According to witness testimony,
Black and Hispanic children are increasingly overrepresented among poor children,
homeless children, drug-exposed children and children in foster care; in 1986, close
to 80% of the children in foster care in NYC were black and Hispanic. In our
study of 194 boarder babies placed with foster families in 1987, close to 95%
were children of color.
Id. at 38-39; see also Duke, supra note 45, at A6 (stating that according to the American
Public Welfare Association, in 1988, roughly thirty-nine percent of the children in foster care
waiting for permanent placements were Black).
93. In 1985, the percentage of minority children entering the foster care systems in
eight of the most populous states were as follows: fifty-one percent in California, thirty-one
percent in Florida, fifty percent in Illinois, fifty-three percent in Michigan, sixty-five percent
in New Jersey, seventy-two percent in New York, thirty-five percent in Ohio, and fifty-two
percent in Texas. No PLACE TO CALL HOME, supra note 86, at 19. Remember, minority children made up only nineteen percent of the children in the nation. Id. at 38.
94. For example, between 1986 and 1988, in California, although the number of foster
families increased by eleven percent, the number of foster children coming into the system
increased by twenty-eight percent. Id. at 8.
[T]he pool of families potentially available to be foster families has been reduced
because of the changing demographic profile of American families in which both
parents work. . . . [Algencies have not always recognized the need to adapt to the
new demographic realities. . . . [They] screen out singles, low or fixed income
people, people over a certain age, women who work and on and on.
Id. at 51.
95. Lang, supra note 89 (a study by the National Black Child Development Institute revealed that with the overload of Black children in the foster care system, many children were
sent to group homes).
96. While the national median length of stay in foster care is seventeen months, the
median length of stay for a majority of black children exceeds two years. No PLACE TO
CALL HOME, supra note 86, at 39; see also Lang, supra note 89, at A16 (a study by the
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main in long-term foster care.'

These statistics are even more troublesome in the adoption setting. Black children comprise nearly half of the children available for
adoption today.98 They wait twice as long as white children for an

adoptive family." Black children are simply less likely to be adopted
than white children."°° Even worse, statistics show that the percentage of Black children available for adoption far exceeds the percentage of the Black population."1 For example, in 1989, in Maryland,
eighty-five percent of the children available for adoption within the
state were Black, while only twenty-six percent of the population. in
Maryland was Black." Similarly, in Massachusetts, sixty percent of
the children available for adoption within the state were -Black, while

National Black Child Development Institute revealed that Black children remain in foster care
for longer periods of time than white children).
97. Smith, supra note 7, at E3.
98. Gregory Freeman, Adoption Gauge Should Be Love, ST. LOUiS POST-DIsPATCH, Apr.
12, 1994, at lilB (stating that nearly half of the 45,000 children awaiting adoption in this
country are Black).
99. Carol Statuto Bevan, Limits on Transracial Adoption Hurt Children; Foster Care
Limbo, N.Y. TumEs, Dec. 8, 1993, at A24 (editorial by the Director of Public Policy for the
National Council for Adoption stating that Black children wait twice as long as white children for an adoptive home); Freeman, supra note 98, at liB (stating that, according to the
National Council for Adoption, Black children wait three to five years for an adoptive home,
one to two years longer than the wait for white children).
100. A 1993 study showed that a Black child in California's foster care system was
three times less likely to be adopted than a white child. All in the Family, NEw REPuBLIc,
Jan. 24, 1994, at 6 (citing a study by Rick Barth, professor at University of California at
Berkeley), Moreover, that study found that "there are up to 1,200 more African-American
children needing homes in California than African American couples likely to adopt them,"
based on studies of race, population, and adoption statistics. Smith, supra note 7, at E3 (citing the same study by Rick Barth).
101. Beth Brophy, The Unhappy Politics of InterracialAdoption, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REPORT, Nov. 13, 1989, at 72. Moreover, a study conducted by the Child Welfare League
found that while large numbers of Black children were waiting for adoptive homes, large
numbers of white parents were waiting for children, and a limited number of minority adoptive parents were applying to adopt. Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1202 n.103.
An argument consistently put forth by proponents of transracial adoption is that there
are not enough Black families to adopt the Black children available for adoption. This argument has been highly criticized by those who oppose transracial adoption. They explain that
there are reasons that Black families appear to adopt at a lower rate than white families.
Some of these reasons include: lack of programs recruiting adoptive parents in the Black
community; underestimation of the actual number of Black families that actually adopt due to
the large number of extended family adoptions that take place; and biased criteria used by
agencies in selecting adoptive parents. For a discussion of these arguments see Fenton, supra
note 17, at 45-46.
102. Brophy, supra note 101, at 72.
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only five percent of the state population was Black. 03
Today, agencies often do not take steps to free Black children
for adoption if there are no Black families available to adopt
them. 4 These policies have become known as "holding" policies
because agencies "hold" Black children in foster care for lengthy
periods of time when Black adoptive parents are not available,"
even though the child is or could be free for adoption.l" During
this "holding" period, adoptions by white parents are not considered
by the agencies." Professor Bartholet describes two types of holding policies. The first of these policies requires a definite period of
time, anywhere from three to eighteen months, to pass before a
transracial adoption may be considered."
However, Professor
Bartholet states that even those periods of time are not accurate in
many cases because the time period does not begin to run until the
child becomes legally free for adoption." Very often, agencies do
not even seek to free these children for adoption until there are Black
parents waiting for them." 0 Instead, these children wait in foster
homes or institutions for lengthy periods of time, even when there is
a white family available to adopt them. The second type of holding
policy requires that the child be held until active efforts to recruit
minority parents have proven fruitless or until documentation has been

103. Id.
104. "Black children can spend an average of three years in the limbo of foster care before the determination is made that adoption is the best option for them." Bevan, supra note
99, at A24.
Of the 276,300 children of all races in the foster care system in 1985, adoption was
the goal for only 36,000 of them. No PLACE TO CALL HOMF, supra note 86, at 54. However, studies indicate "that even when adoption or reunification has been identified as a goal
for a child, it takes years to implement. ... [e.g., in Maryland it takes 5 years for a child
to be adopted, in Baltimore County it takes 7 years]." Id
105. Numerous statistics show that there are not enough Black homes available to adopt
the number of Black children available for adoption. For example, in April 1991, the Illinois
Department of Child and Family Services announced that fifty-nine Black babies under the
age of two were available for adoption but that no Black families could be found to adopt
them. Jerry Thomas, Should White ParentsAdopt Black Children?, Cm. TRIB., June 23, 1991,
at Cl. It is important to note that many opponents of transracial adoption claim that the lack
of Black adoptive families is not due to a "shortage of families but a matter of institutional
racism that screens out black families." See id. (quoting Zena Oglesby, Executive Director of
the Institute of Black Parenting in Los Angeles).
106. For a detailed discussion of "holding policies," see Bartholet, supra note 11, at
1193-96.
107. Id. at 1193.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1194.
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submitted to prove that such efforts have been made and that minority adoptive parents are not available."' Professor Bartholet comments that many adoption professionals prefer the first type of policy
because it at least sets a limit on the period of time a child may be

"held" by the agency before a transracial adoption is considered"'
and because under the second type of policy, Black children are held
for even longer periods of time.' Both of these holding policies
are particularly troublesome in light of numerous studies which show

that the effects of foster care can be damaging to a child. The foster
care system is clearly an unacceptable way to provide for these children;. 4 it should not be employed to their detriment." 5 Moreover,

11. Id. For example, New York state policy "requires an agency 'to make an effort to
place each child in a home as similar and compatible with his or her ethnic, racial, religious
and cultural background as possible."' Ilene Barth, What Does NY Have Against Mixed-Race
Adoptions?, NEWSDAY, Mar. 5, 1989, at 8. There is no way to determine how long these
efforts can take since "there's no fixed rule about how long agencies can take to find a child
a home, and . . . an agency's placement efforts aren't monitored until a year has passed." Id.
(according to Cheryl Lanier, a state adoption official).
112. Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1194 n.78.
113. Id. at 1194.
114. No PLACE To CALL HoME, supra note 86, at 39-44, 51-54.
Children are put in inappropriate placements, not designed to offer family counseling, psychiatric treatment, or drug treatment. . . . Children are usually placed at
great distances, or even in other states. . . . Little or no work is done to return
children to their families. Most programs consider home visits to be a privilege,
and visits are used as rewards for good behavior rather than as reunification
tools. . . . We continue to see far too many foster children placed out of county,
and separated from their brothers and sisters because of the lack of a sufficient
number of appropriate foster homes. We see far too few visits between birth parents and/or siblings, and far too little attention given to foster parents and foster
children.
Id. at 42-43.
115. Children in foster care are often bounced from home to home without establishing
roots or ties to many of these foster families; moved to different locations throughout the
state; separated from their siblings; physically abused during their placements or on their
return to their biological parents; and left in foster care for years until they are finally adopted. The Kansas Supreme Court recited a chronology of one child's foster placement in which
all of these incidents occurred:
In February 1976, at the age of 11 months, A. was placed in SRS custody
because he was abused and neglected by his biological parents. His older brother,
D., born February 6, 1974, was also placed in SRS custody.
From February 1976 to June 1976, A. and D. were in the Nelson foster
home. Mrs. Nelson requested the removal of A. and D. Her husband was threatening to leave because A.'s whining was getting on his nerves. From June 1976 to
July 1976, A. was separately placed in the Smith foster home. In July 1976, A.
was returned to his biological mother. A. was removed from his mother's home
later that month and admitted to the University of Kansas Medical Center (UKMC)
with a diagnosis of child abuse (a broken wrist, facial bruises, and swelling of the
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the longer children are held in foster care awaiting adoption, the less
likely they will ever be adopted.
E. Educational Programsfor TransracialFamilies

There have been numerous articles suggesting what non-minority
parents might do to help their minority adopted child adapt to their
family situation more easily."' In fact, recently, the Institute for

Black Parenting, which has traditionally focused on finding Black
families to adopt Black children, decided to offer classes to white
families who have adopted Black children to teach them how to han-

forehead).
A. remained in UKMC until the end of July 1976, when he was placed in
the emergency care foster home of Diana and Richard Goza. In August 1976, A.
was moved from the Goza foster home to the Gregory foster home ....
In September 1976, A. was removed from the Gregory home and placed back with the
Gozas because the Gregorys were unable to deal with A.'s temper tantrums. A.
remained in the Goza foster home until August 1980, when SRS removed him as
a result of a sexual manipulation incident involving the Goza's 12-year-old daughter. A. was placed in another emergency care foster home. A. later resided in a
foster home in Leavenworth. All of A.'s previous foster homes had been in Kansas
City, Kansas.
In November 1980, after various visits, A. was placed, on an adoptive basis, in the Topeka home of Gloria G., a single African-American woman. On
March 1, 1982, Gloria formally adopted A.
Gloria G. v. Dep't of Social and Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979, 981 (Kan. 1992).
116. E.g., Maureen McCauley, Transracial Adoption: Questions and Challenges for Children & Parents Alike, WASH. PosT, Nov. 8, 1993, at B5.
Some adoption specialists suggest that adopting two minority children, if
possible, may help a child feel less isolated ....
To acknowledge differences and build cultural pride in children, [Sherry D.
Molock, an assistant professor of psychology at Howard University and a practicing
psychologist] urges adoptive parents "to get information about the child's birth
culture. Parents should be aware of the holidays and customs of the birth country
and incorporate these elements into their family life." Many adoptive parents bring
back artifacts from their child's native country, take their children to international
festivals, and read books about the country and culture . ...
In addition to integrating the child's birth culture as a valuable part of
family life, White parents need to be role models for their children in their response to racism, to teach them to recognize and reject it . ...
For starters, adoptive parents need to be sensitive not only to their child's
culture, but to other cultures as well. No ethnic slurs should be tolerated, no racist
remark left unaddressed. Jokes about any ethnic group, not just those of the family, should be discouraged. Interracial families-and maybe all homes-ought to
have dolls of different racial groups, pictures, book, and magazines of all kinds of
people ....
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dle matters ranging from hair and skin care to discrimination." 7 By
dispensing literature and by providing opportunities for white adoptive
parents to speak with Black adults about specific issues that have
been a problem, these classes can provide valuable information to
concerned parents. However, these classes should be voluntary and
not mandated by either a court1 or an adoption agency because
such a mandate might provoke hostility and resentment in the adoptive parents, who may have already taken steps to ensure that they
have prepared to adopt a child of a different race.
Another idea that has been proposed is for adoption agencies to
monitor those homes where Black children have been adopted by
white families to ensure that the children are learning about their own
heritage." 9 However, it seems doubtful that adoption agencies have
the resources for this type of monitoring or that they would have any
recourse if families were not in fact teaching the children about their
heritage. Moreover, even if the agencies did have sufficient resources
to monitor these families, such an intrusion into family life would
likely be unconstitutional. 2 '
The Black community should realize that the situation for Black
children is only getting worse. The first priority in placing Black children must be finding them homes with parents who love them. If
those homes cannot be Black homes, the Black community should do
everything it can to help Black children become comfortable with
their Black identity. Classes, such as those offered by the Institute for
Black Parenting, should be offered for both white adoptive parents as
well as Black adopted children. Such classes provide an excellent
opportunity for Black children to be exposed to Black adults. Moreover, the Black community should offer a Black role model program,
whereby Black children living in white families could be exposed to
Black families on a visitation basis. Black families might include the
child in some of their family gatherings, teach the child about Black
culture, or simply be available if the child feels he needs to speak
with someone of his own race. Moreover, the children of the Black

117. See Smith, supra note 7.
118. See, e.g., Court Sets Terms for Whites Adopting Black, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1990,

at A13. A referee in the Hamilton County Court ordered a white foster family to receive an
education in Black culture as a prerequisite to their being able to adopt their Black foster
child, who they had had custody of since she was an infant. Ila; Freeman, supra note 98, at
1lB.
119. See Freeman, supra note 98, at 1lB.

120. See Fenton, supra note 17, at 54-59.
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families might provide valuable friendships to transracially adopted
children who may have only white friends because of the neighborhoods they live in or the schools they attend. This type of program
might be embraced by a number of Black parents who simply cannot
adopt a child but would like to do something to help Black children.
White parents themselves know that it will take a lot more effort
to raise Black children, yet many are willing to try and often will
take the extra steps necessary to ensure that the child will be comfortable with his identity."' These steps often include teaching them
about their ethnic culture, taking them to cultural awareness activities,
and exposing them to Black playmates and Black role models."
Today, white parents have become more aware of the fact that they
cannot simply ignore their Black child's race, but must recognize and
embrace it. In fact, those who do not take these steps to teach their
Black adoptive children about their cultural heritage may fail to do so
simply out of ignorance as to how important these steps are in the
child's socialization process. Thus, education programs and recruiting
transracial families into these education programs should be a high
priority for the Black community.

121. See McCauley, supra note 116 (interviewing transracially adoptive parents).
Mou 'have to make a commitment to having a culturally diverse life'
when adopting transracially, says Carol Roberts [a transracially adoptive parent].
'Obviously teaching kids about racism is harder for us. You can't do it if you live
in an exclusive world. Our decision to live in an integrated area has been a conscious one, even before adopting. We constantly try to respond to things sensitively, but our reaction to racism is not reflexive. I may not be able to teach my
children everything, but I'm sure going to try hard.'
Id.
122. See Raymond & Turner, supra note 8 (recounting the struggle that Turer's family
went through to hold onto Jordan, their Black foster child).
I'm sure life is easier when parents and children are of the same race, but we feel
our love for Jordan can overcome any drawbacks. He'll have plenty of exposure to
black friends and role models-our church, local schools, and neighborhood are
integrated, and adults and children of all races regularly visit our home. The mother of one of Jordan's black playmates has agreed to be his surrogate grandmother,
and members of Joy of Jesus, an interdenominational community-outreach group in
Detroit, regularly sends us information on black history and culture.
Bob and I have also decided to adopt another black baby, Myryah, to share
Jordan's heritage and complete our family.
ld. at 144; see also Freeman, supra note 98, at lB.
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F. Efforts to Recruit Minority Adoptive Parents
1. Changing the Criteria
Many opponents and proponents of transracial adoption argue
that the adoption system was designed to place white children with
white families and that the system has never quite adapted to placing
Black children with Black families." They contend that an adoption
agency should not employ the same criteria when searching for a
Black adoptive family as it does when it searches for a white adoptive family. Many assert that using the same criteria prevents Black
families from becoming adoptive families and they cite studies to
prove their point. 24 For example, a National Urban League Study
found that although 800 Black families applied to become adoptive
families, only two of those families were accepted."z That approval
rate equals one-quarter of one percent whereas the national average
approval rate equals ten percent."
Accordingly, they argue that adoption agencies should not employ the traditional criteria when searching for Black adoptive families because that criteria focuses on white middle class values. This
traditional criteria has often focused upon two-parent families, where
the parents were relatively young, had a stable marriage, and were
economically secure. Some argue that since more and more Black
families are headed by single parents," z and since this type of family structure has been a tradition in the Black community, single parent adoptions should be encouraged." They assert that there should
be no reason to deny a single parent an adoption simply because of
that person's marital status. Similarly, because parenting by grandparents and great-grandparents has traditionally been done in the

123. See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 17, at 39-40.
124. See Clarence Page, Missing the Point About Transracial Adoptions, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Dec. 8, 1993, at B7.
125. Id. The article cites another instance where two thousand Black families responded
to a California television advertisement to become adoptive parents, yet only fifteen families

were accepted. Id.
126. Id.
127. For example, in 1990, more than half of all Black children lived only with their

mothers as compared to less than a quarter of all white children. Allen, supra note 87, at
132 n.9.
128. Fenton, supra note 17, at 63.
129. This approach has been codified by the Connecticut legislature. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45a-727 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (providing that "[t]he court of probate shall not
disapprove any adoption under this section solely because of an adopting parent's marital
status . . . ").
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Black commuity, age alone, should not be a basis for denying adop30

tion.1

In response, agencies have abandoned traditional criteria when
recruiting Black adoptive families, at least significantly, if not completely. 3 1 However, these agencies have not "repudiated these criteria as irrelevant to determining parental fitness."' 32 Consequently,
Black adoptive families may be older, 33 poorer and more likely
to be single than white adoptive families.135 In seeking to expand
the list of prospective Black adoptive parents, adoption agencies have
included Black families on a prospective Black parent list that would
normally be excluded from a prospective white parent list. 36 Moreover, those at the bottom of the Black parent list are given priority
over those at the top of the white parent list.'37
The agencies fail to consider that when placing children, the
standard to be used regardless of race is "the best interests of the
child." One might question whether placement with an older, single,
Black parent who has a low income and lives in a relatively poor
neighborhood is in the best interests of the child. Opponents of
transracial adoption would of course state that this is in the best
interests of the child because it allows the child to be adopted by a
parent of the same race. They would put race above all other factors
and would prefer to see a child living in this situation rather than
living with a white family who meets the traditional adoptive family
criteria. This view completely ignores the best interests of the child
standard by placing a Black child in a setting in which a white child
would not be placed, simply because the child is Black, not because
the setting is in the best interests of the child.
Black children are being placed with parents that agencies would

130. Fenton, supra note 17, at 63.
131. See, e.g., id. at 59-66.
132. BARTHOLET, supra note 4, at 96.
133. Professor Bartholet cites to a 1986 study which showed that forty-five percent of
minority adoptive fathers were age forty-five or over in contrast to only nineteen percent of
white adoptive fathers and fourteen percent of minority adoptive fathers were age sixty-one or
over in contrast to only two percent of white adoptive fathers. Bartholet, supra note 11, at
1200.
134. Professor Bartholet cites to a 1986 study which showed that fifty percent of minority adoptive families in contrast to fourteen percent of white adoptive families had incomes
below $20,000 per year and twenty percent of minority families in contrast to two percent of
white families had incomes below $10,000 per year. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.

137. Id.
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not even consider for a white child's placement. How then, can anyone say that these children are being treated "equally" under the law?
Clearly they are not. If Black children are not forced to languish in

foster care, they are forced into adoption by families who society says
should not be permitted to adopt children because they are incapable

of caring for children. It is not that society does not believe that
these potential adoptive parents are moral or loving people. Rather, it
is that they do not have the time, energy or money necessary to raise

a child today. In the name of race matching, however, Black children
are being placed witit these less fit parents.'
2. Recruitment Programs
The Black community has reacted to the shortage of Black adoptive parents in numerous ways which have been very effective. These

include private Black adoption agencies and recruiting agencies. For
example, there are private Black adoption agencies such as the Institute for Black Parenting'39 and ROOTS"' which have had enor-

mous success in finding Black families to adopt Black children. Some
of these agencies have even been more successful than traditional

adoption agencies 4' and state agencies. For instance, Homes for
Black Children, a Black adoption agency, placed 132 Black children
138. See Barth, supra note il1, at 8 (quoting a child welfare specialist who remained
unnamed because he feared reprisal as stating that "[t]he walking wounded can adopt, as long
as they're black").
139. After only two years of operation, the Institute for Black Parenting had already
placed 200 Black children with Black families. See Bates, supra note 16, at 94. The adoption
agency attributes its success to taking a different approach to finding adoptive parents.
Everything public agencies do, we don't. We send Black social workers to Black
homes to interview these families. We send them at night and on weekends, when
it's convenient for working people. We don't charge money for adoptions (most
private agencies do). And we try to place a child within a few months (usually
two to eight) and not the year and a half to three years it takes public agencies to
place them.
Id. (quoting Zena F. Oglesby, Jr., Executive Director of the Institute for Black Parenting).
After five years of operation, the Institute had increased adoptions by thirty-nine percent in
the four major counties of Southern California by employing these innovative ideas. Page,
supra note 124, at B7.
140. Toni Oliver, Looking at Adoption in Black and White, ATLANTA CONSr., Dec. 9,
1993, at K5 (noting that ROOTS committed itself to increasing adoption opportunities for
Black children by eliminating the barriers to adoption that Black families often experience
and by obtaining a list of potential Black adoptive families).
141. A report by the North American Council on Adoptable Children reported that Black
adoption agencies found same race homes for Black children ninety-four percent of the time,
while traditional private adoption agencies which found same race homes for Black children
only fifty.one percent of the time. See id.
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in Black homes during one year, which equalled more placements
than all of Detroit's other child welfare agencies combined. 42
Other agencies have been successful as recruiting agencies. For
example, Miracle Makers, a nonprofit agency, placed 671 Black children in 473 Black foster homes during a two year period by recruiting parents at churches, civic centers, and homes." 3 The agency later sent letters to those 473 homes asking them if they were interested
in adopting the children and they received 125 affirmative replies.'"
Other programs such as One Church, One Child have been likewise
successful. The premise of this organization is to ask each church to
find one family in its congregation to adopt a child.145 With more
than 1,000 Black churches in the Central City and South-Central Los
Angeles area alone, it is easy to see how this organization can reach
thousands of potential adoptive families and be successful.'" Another way that agencies have recruited Black adoptive parents is by
having an Annual Black Adoption Fair. 47 This type of fair enables
prospective adoptive parents to meet with the prospective adoptive
children 4 ' and see how they get along.
Others have suggested ways for agencies to improve recruiting
further. For instance, in addition to searching among strangers to the
child, programs may want to focus on searching for relatives of the
child who may be willing to adopt the child. 49 Their search should
not be limited to the extended family of the child, such as grandparents, aunts and uncles, but should also include "fictive kin" derived
from the community and friends.'
In addition to programs which seek to recruit Black adoptive
parents, there are entitlement programs which make payments to
parents who want to adopt but cannot afford to do so. As encouraging as these programs may seem, they do have their limitations and

142. Page, supra note 124, at B7.
143. Richard Lacayo, Nobody's Children, TIME, Oct. 9, 1989, at 91.

144. Id.
145. Andrea Heiman, Southern California File, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1993, at B5.
146. Id. (quoting the Secretary of the Board of Directors of the program as stating that
the program has "heightened the awareness of the African American community for the need
for African American families to come forward and become part of the process").
147. See Lang, supra note 89, at A16.
148. Id. (describing an adoption fair in San Francisco where 250 prospective Black adop-

tive and foster care parents met and talked with more than 100 Black children in need of
homes).
149. Fenton, supra note 17, at 62-66.
150. Id.
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will only increase adoptions among Black families to the extent that
Black families do not adopt for financial reasons.' However, all
states have Adoption Assistance Programs.' The intent of these
state assistance programs is to serve two important purposes: first,

they offer incentives to families to adopt children who might not
otherwise be adopted and second, they reduce the government's

spending on the foster care systems which have proven financially
burdensome to the state and inimical to the best interests of children.' These programs vary by state. For example, the California
program provides that at the time an application for adoption is made
for a child who is potentially eligible for assistance,"5 the adoption
agency or the department shall notify the prospective adoptive parents
about their eligibility for the benefits. 5 The statewide median in-

come is used to determine eligibility; only those families with incomes below the median may qualify for an amount up to the state
151. Howard, supra note 33, at 546 n.216.
152. No PLACE TO CALL HOME, supra note 86, at 170. The federal government provides
the states with matching funds for these subsidies. La
153. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16122(a) (West 1991) (stating that the purpose of the entitlement program is to "provide special needs children with permanent adoptive
homes" and to "encourage private adoption agencies to continue placing special needs children, and in so doing, to achieve a substantial savings to the state in foster care costs");
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 450 (McKinney 1992) (stating that the purpose of the entitlement
program is to "promote permanency of family status through adoption for children who might
not otherwise derive the benefits of that status" and to "substantially reduce, unnecessary and
inappropriate long-term foster care situations which have proven financially burdensome to the
state and, more importantly, inimical to the best interests of many children").
154. In order to be eligible for assistance, a child must meet the requirements of CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16120 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). By virtue of their race, Black
children meet the first requirement which states that "[aldoptive placement without financial
assistance is unlikely . . . by virtue of race, ethnicity, color ...
" Id. § 16120(a)(1).
155. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16119(a) (West Supp. 1994). The New York program
is similar but it goes one step further and requires the Social Services district or the agency
"to provide information on the adoption subsidy program to all foster care parents who are
caring for a child who is eligible for adoption." N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 458 (McKinney
1992). This program would probably be more effective in finding homes for children in
foster care because it requires that the foster care parents be informed about the subsidies
even before they consider adopting the child, whereas the California program only requires
informing the prospective parents once they have made an application for adoption. The New
York program is clearly preferable to handle those situations where foster parents would like
to adopt a child but do not think they can afford to do so because they will lose their payments under the foster care program. Therefore, they continue as foster parents even though
they could probably become adoptive parents. Under the New York program, they will be
advised about the subsidies and may well decide to adopt their foter child. Under the California program, the foster care parents may not know that they can get subsidies until after
they have made the decision to adopt, a decision which may never be made because they
think that they cannot afford to do so.
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approved foster care rate.'56 The amount of benefits received are
based on the needs of the child and the ability of the family to meet

those 8needs."
15

These benefits may be provided for up to five

years.

3. Recruitment Statutes
Some states have taken the initiative and have enacted legislation

requiring agencies to recruit adoptive families of the same racial or
ethnic heritage as the child.

9

For example, Minnesota requires

agencies to make "special efforts" to recruit families of the same
ethnic or racial heritage as the child. "Special efforts" include "contacting and working with community organizations and religious organizations and may include contracting with these organizations, utilizing local media and other local resources, and conducting outreach
activities."''
In order to satisfy this "special efforts" requirement,
the agency must continue these efforts for six months after the child

156. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16119(c), (d) (West Supp. 1994). However, even those
families with incomes above the statewide median may qualify to receive benefits up to the
state approved specialized care increments. Id. § 16119(d)(2).
157. CAL. WELF. & INT. CODE § 16119(c).
158. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16121.05(d) (Vest Supp. 1994). The benefits can be
extended for more than five years if there is a continuing need for support related to a
chronic health condition. However, benefits cannot be extended past the time the child reaches the age of eighteen. Id. By contrast, the New York program provides that benefits shall
be paid until the child reaches the age of twenty-one. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 453(l)(a)
(McKinney 1992).
159. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.455 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). Minnesota also has
a similar statute for recruiting foster families of the same racial or ethnic heritage as the
child. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.072(subd. 1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). That statute even
provides that the Commissioner of Human Services shall have a permanent staff position for
a "Minority Recruitment Specialist" whose responsibility is to "provide services to child-placing agencies seeking to recruit minority adoptive and foster care families and qualified minority professional staff." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.072(subd. 3). In addition, the statute imposes
duties upon child-placing agencies. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.072(subd. 7). Some of those
duties are that the agency must:
[1] have a written plan for recruiting minority adoptive and foster families. The
plan must include (a) strategies for using existing resources in minority communities, (b) use of minority outreach staff wherever possible, (c) use of minority foster
homes for placements after birth and before adoption, and (d) other techniques as
appropriate:
[2] have a written plan for training adoptive and foster families of minority children;
[3] if located in an area with a significant minority population, have a written plan
for employing minority social workers in adoption and foster care.
Id.
160. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.455.
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becomes available for adoption.'
Likewise, California requires
agencies to show that a "diligent search" has been made for a family
meeting the criteria of the California preference statute." In making
a diligent search, the agency "shall use all appropriate resources...
through (1) the use of all appropriate intra-agency and interagency,
state, regional, and national exchanges and listing books, (2) child-

specific recruitment in electronic and printed media coverage, and (3)
the use of agency contacts with parent groups to advocate for specific
waiting children."' The statute imposes an additional burden on the
agency by requiring them to maintain records for each child to show
that a diligent search has been made."
IT. RACE AS A FACTOR IN PLACEMENT DECISIONS

A. State Statutes

1. Preference Statutes
In response to concerns about transracial adoptions, three states
have enacted what can be called preference statutes1 65 These statutes

161. Id.
162. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710 (West Supp. 1994). For a discussion of the California

preference statute, see infra part UI.A.1.
163. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8710.
164. Id.
165. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102(b) (Michie 1987); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West
Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§

259.455.

While other states do not have specific legislation providing preferences for adoption
placement, some do have regulations on preferences. For example, even though Texas has
recently adopted a statute which forbids the use of race as a primary factor in making placement decisions, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.081 (West Supp. 1994), it previously had regulatory guidelines which made same race placements a preference. See TEXAS DEP'T OF HUMAN
SERV., CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES HANDBOOK § 6925 (1990) reprinted in Jo Beth Eubanks,
Transracial Adoption in Texas: Should the Best Interests Standard be Color-Blind?, 24 ST.
MARY'S LJ. 1225, 1227 n.7 (1993). The regulations provided that:

The workers and supervisors must consider the following issues when selecting a
home.
1. The child's need for placement with his siblings. DHS prefers to place siblings
as a family group ...
2. Preservation of the child's racial and ethnic identity and heritage. DHS prefers
to place children with adoptive parents whose race or ethnicity is the same as the
child's.
Note: When the selection of an adoptive home does not conform to either of the
two considerations listed above, the worker must document the reasons for the
exception and the supervisor must approve and sign the worker's documentation.
Id,
Some states provide similar statutes for foster care placements. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
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give preference to adoptive parents of the same race as the child. For
example, the Minnesota statute provides that:
The authorized child placing agency shall give preference, in the
absence of good cause to the contrary, to placing the child with (a)
a relative or relatives of the child, or if that would be detrimental to
the child or a relative is not available, (b) a family with the same
racial or ethnic heritage as the child, or, if that is not feasible, (c) a
family of different racial or ethnic heritage from the child which is
knowledgeable and appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic heritage. 1

Minnesota also has a similar preference statute which applies to the
court when reviewing and determining appropriate adoption placements. 67
Besides encouraging holding policies, the Minnesota statute is
troublesome in other ways. First, it provides that a child should be
placed with a relative unless it "would be detrimental to the

9-102(a) (Michie 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.071(subd. 1-a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
For example, the Minnesota statute provides that an "agency shall ensure that the child's best
interests are met by giving due, not sole, consideration of the child's race or ethnic heritage
in making a family foster care placement." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.071(subd. I-a). Thus,
the agency is required to consider the child's race or ethnic heritage from the outset. Moreover, the Minnesota statute even provides that where a child is placed in a family foster
home of a different racial or ethnic background, the agency "shall review the placement after
30 days and each 30 days thereafter for the first six months to determine if there is another
available placement that would better satisfy the requirements of [subdivision I-a]." Id. These
statutes have become important due to the changing role of the foster care system. What was
once viewed as a temporary home has now become a home for a much longer period of
time. Moreover, often agencies will offer adoption opportunities to foster care parents. Thus,
if it is the policy of the state to race-match adoptions, the state must also race-match foster
care placements since they may later lead to adoptions.
166. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). In the Minnesota statute,
the legislature stated that the policy of the state is "to ensure that the best interests of the
child are met by requiring due, not sole, consideration of the child's race or ethnic heritage
in adoption placements." Id. The statute originally required "due consideration" of the child's
race or ethnic heritage, however, it was amended in 1993 to require "due, not sole, consideration" of the child's race or ethnic heritage. Id.
167. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.28(subd. 2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) provides:
In reviewing adoptive placement, the court shall consider preference, and in determining the appropriate adoption, the court shall give preference, in the absence of
good cause to the contrary, to (a) a relative or relatives of the child, or, if that
would be detrimental to the child or a relative is not available, to (b) a family
with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child, or if that is not feasible, to
(c)a family of different racial or ethnic heritage from the child that is knowledgeable and appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic heritage.
The preferences in the Arkansas statute mimic those in the Minnesota statute. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-102 (Michie 1993).
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child."' 68 A standard which merely considers whether the placement
would be "detrimental to the child" is a marked departure from one
which considers "the best interests of the child." One can easily
imagine a situation where a placement, although not detrimental to
the child, is not in the best interests of the child. Nonetheless, under
the Minnesota statute the child would have to be placed in that situation. The best interests of the child has been the traditional standard
employed by courts in making child placement decisions, 69 yet nowhere in the Minnesota statute is there a requirement that these preferences be followed consistent with the child's best interests. While it
is true that Minnesota subordinates statutory preferences to the best
interests of the child standard, 7 ' a court might still misapply the
preferences as a result of giving the statutory "detrimental to the
child" standard too much weight.
Also, the Minnesota statute provides that the second preference is
for placement with a family of the same race unless "that is not
feasible.'' However, nowhere in the statute does the legislature define what is meant by "not feasible." Thus, this non-feasible language
may provide an avenue for agencies to continue the holding policies
that they have previously used. For example, an agency could arguably hold a child in an institutional setting for an indefinite period of
time until a family of the same race becomes available and be protected by the statute. By stating that an agency is permitted to seek
parents of a different race only after a determination that finding
parents of the same race is not feasible, Minnesota is condoning and
encouraging the holding policies that agencies follow today. To avoid
this, the statute should have defined "feasibility" by placing a limit
on the period of time that a child can be held by an agency while it
seeks a family with "the same racial or ethnic heritage as the
72
child."'
The Minnesota statute does provide an exception to the "same
race" preference for placements where there is "good cause to the
contrary."'7 However, the legislature again does not define what it
means. It is arguable that "good cause to the contrary" could encompass the best interests of the child standard, however it is by no
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255.
See infra notes 262-69 and accompanying text.
In re Jordet, 80 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Minn. 1957).
MNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255(b).
Id.
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255.
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means clear. Consequently, in a situation where the placement of a
child with a relative is not "detrimental to the child," but is also not
in "the child's best interests," the court could avoid making the placement by relying on the "good cause to the contrary language." However, in the interest of clarity and as a safeguard for the child's interests, the Minnesota legislature should have used the traditional best
interests of the child standard.
The statute does provide that if the biological parent explicitly
requests that the preferences not be followed, the agency "shall honor
that request consistent with the best interests of the child." 74 This
section may be particularly important, for example, in a situation
where a teenage mother wants to give up her baby for adoption but
her parents want to keep it. It would allow the teenage mother to
give her child up for adoption without fear that the grandparents
would adopt the child. While the statutory preference would call for
placing the child with the grandparents (i.e., with relatives) the teenage mother could request that this preference not be followed. This
request will be honored if it is found to be in the newborn child's
best interests. 75 However, it is unlikely that a Minnesota court
would find that the statutory preference was not in the child's best
interests.
One of the first cases to challenge the Minnesota preference
statute was In re D.L. 76 At that time the Minnesota preference statute applied only to the placement of minority children and the appellants raised the issue of whether the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by establishing preferences only for the adoption of minority children. 77 The court stated that it was not necessary to reach
that constitutional issue to resolve this case because a strong family
preference exists for all child placements, regardless of race or ethnicity.7 Whether or not the statute was constitutional, the court stated
that a strong familial preference has always been embodied in the
best interests of the child standard." 9 Accordingly, the court held

that an "adoptive placement with a family member is presumptively
in the best interests of a child, absent a showing of good cause to the
174. Id.
175. Id.

176. 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992).
177.
178.
apply to
179.

Id. at 379.
Id. Thereafter, the statute was amended to read as stated in supra note 167 and to
children generally.
486 N.W.2d at 379-80.
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contrary or detriment to the child. ' ' "w The rationale behind the presumption is that those who are related to the child will be willing to
do more for the child's welfare than those who are not."' It would
seem almost certain from this case that the Supreme Court of Minnesota would hold that the current preference statute is constitutional.
Another version of the preference statute is California's, which
provides:
Where a child is being considered for adoption, the following order
of placement preferences regarding racial background and ethnic
identification shall be used ... in determining the placement of the
child:
(a) In the home of a relative.
(b) If a relative is not available, or if placement with available
relatives is not in the child's best interest, with an adoptive family
with the same racial background or ethnic identification as the child.
If the child has a mixed racial or ethnic background, placement
shall be made with a family of the racial or ethnic group with
which the child has the more significant contacts.
(c) If placement cannot be made under the rules set forth in this
section within 90 days from the time the child is relinquished for
adoption or has been declared free from parental custody or control,
the child is free for adoption with a family of a different racial
background or ethnic identification where there is evidence of sensitivity to the child's race, ethnicity, and culture .... Unless it can
be documented that a diligent search ... for a family meeting the
placement criteria has been made, a child may not be placed for
adoption with a family of a different racial background or ethnic
identification .... 1
While the California statute shows improvements, it also reinforces the acceptability of adoption agency holding policies by not prohibiting them outright. In fact, it actually encourages holding policies
by establishing a detailed set of preferences for same race placements
and requiring a "diligent search" to be documented before a child can
be placed transracially"' These documentation requirements frequently act as a deterrent to social workers to make transracial placements for fear that even though they did a diligent search, the docu-

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 380.
Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708 (West Supp. 1994).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(c).
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mentation may not appear to support their conclusion.'
Although the California statute attempts to limit the period of
time that a child can be held by an agency,"'5 this limitation is ineffective in reducing the period of time a child can spend in the foster
care system because it only applies to the child after the "child is
relinquished for adoption" or is "declared free from parental custody
'
or control."186
As previously discussed, holding policies allow social
workers to delay freeing the child for adoption until such time when
same race parents are available.' Thus, under this statute, an agency can keep a child in foster care indefinitely before freeing her for
adoption and it is only once the child is freed for adoption that the
ninety day time limit comes into effect. This ninety day limit will
never become an issue because the adoption agency can delay freeing
the child for adoption until such time as it has Black adoptive parents
immediately available to adopt the child. Without an additional time
restriction on the agencies limiting the amount of time a child can sit
in foster care before being freed for adoption, agencies can continue
to hold Black children in foster care for years without hope of a
permanent family.
Moreover, the California statute is unclear as to how biracial
children should be placed. It provides that biracial children should be
placed with a family with a racial background with which the child
has "the more significant contacts."' 88 The statute does not define
"more significant contacts" and therefore, the term will be left to
judicial interpretation. With respect to older children, the court may
be able to rely on the child's past upbringing. For example, if the
child had been brought up by her Black parent in a predominantly
Black neighborhood, attending Black churches and schools, the court
could easily determine with which race the child has had more significant contacts. The majority of cases, however, will not be so clear.
Moreover, when placing an infant, who has had no contact with either race, the decision may be based solely on the child's skin color-with light-skinned biracial children being placed with white parents and dark-skinned children being placed with Black parents. Since

184. See Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1195.
185.

"If placement cannot be made .

relinquished for adoption

. . .

.

. within 90 days from the time the child was

the child is free for adoption with a family of a different

racial background or ethnic identification .
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(c).
186. Id.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 104-15.
188. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(b).
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there are currently more white parents available to adopt, lightskinned biracial children will have an extreme advantage over their
darker-skinned counterparts who will sit in foster care simply because
they were born with darker skin.
Despite the negative aspects of the California statute, it does
provide some improvements over the Minnesota statute. The California statute, like its Minnesota counterpart, provides that there can be
a showing of good cause not to follow the preferences provided in
the statute."89 Unlike the Minnesota statute, however, the California
statute defines "good cause." It provides that good cause can be based
on: the request of the birth parent; the extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child; the fact that the child has been legally free
for adoption for more than ninety days and even though a diligent
search has been made, no family meeting the preference has been
found; or the fact that application of the preference statute would not
be in the best interests of the child.' 9 This last basis for avoiding
the preference statute is the most significant. By providing that the
statute can be avoided when it is in the best interests of the child, the
California legislature has at least provided the court with a means of
avoiding a same race placement where it is not in the child's best
interests. This is particularly important in placements where the child
has been in a foster care placement with a white family for years before a Black adoptive family becomes available to adopt the child.
The statute provides that in these situations, the judge will not be
bound by the statutory preferences to place the child with Black
adoptive parents if such placement is not in the best interests of the
child. Therefore, the court could consider whether the emotional
bonding between the Black child and her white foster parents outweighs the fact that Black adoptive parents are now available. Thus,
the court's decision will be based on the child's best interests rather
than on the preference statute alone.
Lastly, with respect to placement with relatives, the statute provides that the child shall not be placed with relatives if it is not in
the best interests of the child.' 9' In this way, the California approach
is consistent with the standard by which child placements have historically been made 92 and not with the Minnesota approach, which is

189. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8709 (West Supp. 1994).
190. Id.
191. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8708(b).

192. Traditionally child placement decisions have been made based on the best interests
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to place the child with a relative unless it would be detrimental to the
19 3
child.
Although both the California and the Minnesota statutes act as
three-tier preferences, I suggest that the legislatures used this three-tier

preference simply as a distraction from the statutes' real purpose.
Since there has always been a preference for placing a child with
relatives when making placements,"9 there is no reason why a statu-

tory preference for relatives is necessary. This common law preference stems from the premise that a person will better care for a child
to whom he is related than one to whom he is not.19 In fact, the

"relative" preference is actually encompassed in the "same race" preference since a child's relatives will be the same race as the child.

However, by placing relatives as the first preference, the legislature
masked its real purpose which was to provide a statutory preference
for same race placements and to provide that different race place-

ments should be used only as a last resort. By hiding behind this
three-tier preference, however, the legislatures have attempted to re-

move themselves from being attacked based on their true purpose.
2. Anti-Discrimination Statutes
In contrast to preference statutes, some states have adopted statutes which provide that a petition for adoption shall not be denied on
the basis of a difference in race or ethnic heritage between the prospective adoptive parent and the child. 6 In states such as Connecti-

of the child. See infra notes 262-69 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 379-80 (Minn. 1992).
195. Id. at 380.
196. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(c)(3) (West 1993) (The court "shall not
disapprove any adoption under this section solely because of. . . a difference in race, color
or religion between a prospective adopting parent and the child to be adopted") (emphasis
added); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.471 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) ("Petitions for adoption . . . shall not be denied on the basis of the religious, ethnic, racial, or interfaith background of the adoptive applicant .
)...");
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.081 (West Supp.
1994) ("In determining the best interest of the child . . . the court may not deny or delay
the adoption or otherwise discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity of the child or the
prospective adoptive parents."); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.82(6) (West 1987 & Supp.
1994) ("No otherwise qualified person shall be denied the benefits of [the adoption] subchapter because of his or her race, color, ancestry or national origin.").
Peculiarly, even though Kentucky has a statute prohibiting discrimination in adoption,
Kentucky has another statute which provides that if, within five years after the adoption of a
child, the child "reveals definite traits of ethnological ancestry different from those of the
adoptive parents, and of which the adoptive parents had no knowledge or information prior to
the adoption," the adoptive parents may bring a petition and the court may annul the adop-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

41

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 18
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 22:897

cut, the statute merely states that the court may base its decision in
part on race, so long as the decision is not based solely on race."
On the other hand, in states such as Kentucky and Texas, the statutes
are more prohibitive of any use of race to deny an application for
adoption. 98' These statutes simply provide that an adoption may not
be denied on the basis of race."9 Thus, they are more prohibitive in
that not only may race not be the "sole" basis for denial of the adoption, it may not be the basis for denial at all. For example, in a
situation where "but for" the factor of race an adoption petition
would have been approved, the Kentucky and Texas statutes would be
violated. As such, these statutes afford Black children greater opportunity for placement in permanent homes by prohibiting any consideration of race in the adoption process.
The Kentucky statute also provides that the prohibition against
denying adoptions on the basis of race shall not apply if it is against
the wishes of the biological parent." This provision has the effect
of transforming the Kentucky statute into a preference statute by
permitting the court to deny an adoption petition on the basis of race
where that is the desire of the biological parent. Moreover, the Kentucky statute contains no exception for an adoption which is in the
best interests of the child."el Thus, in Kentucky, a transracial adoption which is in the best interests of the child may be denied because
the biological parent expressed a desire against such an adoption.
There are also some statutes which provide that a public agency
shall not refuse to place a child with a prospective adoptive parent on
the basis of difference in race.' For example, the Connecticut stat-

tion. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.540 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
197. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(c)(3).
198. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.471; TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.081.
199. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.471 (stating that a "petition for adoption of children . . . shall not be denied on the basis of ...
rac[e]"); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 47.041 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that "a licensed adoption agency may not deny or delay
placement of a child for adoption . . . on the basis of the race or ethnicity of the child or
prospective adoptive parents").

200. E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.471 (stating that denying an adoption petition on.
the basis of race is prohibited "unless [the transracial adoption is] contrary to the expressed
wishes of the biological parent(s)").
201. See id.
202. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726 (West 1993); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.

§ 47.041.
Some states also provide similar statutes for foster care placements. See, e.g., TEx.
HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 41.028 (West Supp. 1994) ("The department [of human resources]
may not prohibit or delay the placement of a child in foster care or remove a child from
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ute provides that "[i]f the comnissioner of children and families is
appointed as statutory parent for any child free for adoption... said
commissioner shall not refuse to place such child with any prospective adoptive parent solely on the basis of a difference in race."'
In contrast to the proposed Senate bill,' the Connecticut statute
does not provide adequate protection to eliminate the race matching
policies that exist. The Connecticut statute applies only to those children who are free for adoption.' Thus, agencies are still able to
engage in race matching games prior to when the child is freed for
adoption.' In fact, it is typically during this time period in which
agencies delay an adoption because Black children are generally not
freed for adoption unless a Black ad6ptive family has already been
found.' In contrast, the Texas statute, appears to address this problem by providing simply that "[tlhe department, a county child-care
or welfare unit, or a licensed adoption agency may not deny or delay
placement of a child for adoption or otherwise discriminate on the
basis of the race or ethnicity of the child or prospective adoptive parents." Although the Texas statute was only recently enacted, and

as a result has been subject to little judicial interpretation, it appears
to apply even to those children who have not yet been freed for

adoption. Therefore, it appears that under the Texas statute an agency
would not be permitted to delay freeing the child for adoption be-

cause that would be considered delaying the placement of a child for
adoption.

3. Reporting Statutes
Other states have adopted statutes that require either the petition

for adoptionN or the order of adoption10 to state the race of the
foster care or otherwise discriminate on the basis of race or ethnicity of the child or the
foster family.").
203. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726 (emphasis added).
204. See discussion infra part IV.A.
205. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-726.
206. For a discussion about the delaying procedures of placement agencies, see supra
part II.D; see also Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1193-96.
207. Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1193-94.
208. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 47.041.
209. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-305 (1989) (A petition for adoption shall contain "the
race ...
of the prospective adoptee, or his natural parent or parents [and] the race . . . of
the petitioner."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.12(1)(c) (West 1987) ("A petition for adoption . . . shall specify . . . [t]he date and place of birth of the child and sex and race."); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701 (Supp. 1993) ("A petition for adoption shall set forth...
[the] racial background of the adopting parent or parents and their relationship, if any, to the
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child, adoptive parents, or both. Where race is a requirement of the
adoption petition, the statute implies that the court may
take race into
211
consideration when making the adoption placement.
In In re V.M. DeF., the court held that where the petitioners
refused to include racial information in the petition, yet the court had
such information from a social services investigation report, the petition for adoption was considered amended to include such information
so that the adoption could be approved."' The petitioners had urged
that the statutory requirement of requiring the race of the prospective
parents and of the child or his natural parents in the petition for
adoption violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment

of the Constitution. 4 While petitioners conceded that race could be
considered a factor when social services examined the prospective
parents' home, they challenged the "predominance" accorded race by
including it in the petition. 5 In holding as it did, the court skirted
the issue of whether the requirement of such information in the petition was constitutional.1 6

adoptee."); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(b) (1991) (stating that the intermediary report
to be filed with the petition "shall set forth ...[the] racial background... of the parents
of the child").
210. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-13 (1984) (The order of adoption shall contain the "color or race . . .of the adopted child" [and the] "color or race . . . of both adop-

tive persons.").
211. See In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 783 (D.C. 1982) (finding that because the statute
which set out the requirements for the petition for adoption required the petition to include
the race of the prospective adoptive parents and the child, the court was permitted to take
race into account).
212. 307 A.2d 737 (D.C. 1973).
213. Id. at 739-40.
214. Id. at 738.
215. Id. at 739.
216. Id. at 740. Significantly, statutes which require marriage license applicants to state
their race have been held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Burton, 400 F. Supp. 960,
963 (D.D.C. 1975). These courts have recognized that once the legal barrier to interracial
marriage had been broken down, race could no longer play a role in whether or not a marriage application was accepted. Therefore, they acknowledged that inclusion of race on the
application affected whether or not the application would be accepted. By contrast, even
though the legal barrier to transracial adoption has been broken down, the inclusion of race
on an adoption petition is still permissible. Because of this, courts still consider race as a
factor in deciding whether or not to approve the adoption even where it is only implicitly
suggested that race should be a factor in making this decision by its inclusion on the petition
for adoption.
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B. Equal Protection Analysis
The Supreme Court has never addressed the use of race as a
factor in foster care or adoption placements. However, the Court has
examined the use of race as a factor in a custody proceeding in
Palmore v. Sidoti.217 That case involved a petition for modification
of a custody award by the child's natural father, a white man, after
the child's natural mother, a white woman, remarried a Black
man.218 The trial court granted the father's petition for custody. The
Supreme Court found that the trial court had based its decision solely
on race.219 The Court held that "[tihe effects of racial prejudice,
however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant
child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody."' Thus, the holding has been interpreted to mean that race cannot be the sole factor in making a
custody decision. Since the lower court had based its decision solely
on the race factor, the court was not presented with the issue of
whether race may be a factor in the decision at all. Thus, Palmore
leaves it "unclear whether race may be a consideration in custody
decisions.
Some suggest that the holding of Palmore applies to transracial
adoption cases.' I disagree. Because adoption cases and custody
cases involve different social realities, it is necessary for the Supreme
Court to decide a transracial adoption case before we apply the same
standards to both types of cases. The social reality of a custody case
means that if the child is not placed with one of his legal parents, he
will be placed with his other legal parent. From the outset, it is clear
that the child will have a home with one of his natural parents. There
is no chance that the child will remain in multiple foster care placements or institutional care for the rest of his minority. By contrast,
the social reality of an adoption case means that if an agency denies
one set of parents the right to adopt a particular child, another set of
parents may not become available for a long period of time or in

217. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
218. Id. at 430.
219. Id. at 432.
220. Id. at 434.
221. There has been much debate about whether Palmore prohibits the consideration of
race entirely from custody decisions. See Perry, supra note 10, at 56 n.7.
222. See generally Angela T. McCormick, TransracialAdoption: A Critical View of the
Courts' Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303 (1989-1990).
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some cases, they will never become available. Once the agency removes the child from the home of the foster care parents who want
to adopt him, the agency risks the chance that that might be the last
stable home in which the child ever lives. In fact, many children are
removed from a foster home even when there is no other foster home
or adoptive home available. Because of these distinctions, even if the
Court's holding in Palmore v. Sidoti would allow race to be a factor,
but not a decisive factor, in a custody hearing between the two natural parents of a child, that alone should not justify subsequent decisions to hold that race may be a factor in adoption decisions.
Lower courts, however, have uniformly applied a rule that race
may be a factor but not the sole factor in making an adoption decision. Because race cannot be the sole factor, statutes which completely banned transracial adoptions have been held unconstitutional.' In
Compos v. McKeithen,' there were two sets of plaintiffs; the first
was a white couple who sought to adopt a Black child, and the second was an interracial couple where the husband was Black and the
wife was white who sought to adopt a child.' The first couple was
informed by the adoption agency that they could not adopt a Black
child because the Louisiana statute" prohibited, the adoption of a
child of a different race than the parents and the second couple was
informed that because they were of different races they could not
become adoptive parents. 7 The rationale for the statute put forth by
the defendants was that it is not "normal or natural" for white parents
to have a Black child or for Black parents to have a white child.'
The court found, however, that the inherent problems in a
transracial adoption justified the consideration of race but did not
justify its use as a determinative factor. 9 The court stated that a
"statute making race the decisive factor in adoption subordinates the
child's best interests in some circumstances to racial discrimination.
The statute thus promotes not the child's best interests but only the
integrity of race in the adoptive family relationship." 0 Accordingly,

223. See supra note 32.
224. 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court).

225. Id. at 265.
226. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 (West 1965). See supra note 30 for the text of the
Louisiana statute.
227. 341 F. Supp. at 265.

228. Id. at 266.
229. Id.

230. Id. at 267.
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the court held that the Louisiana statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.231
In so holding, the court reasoned that statutes employing a racial
classification must be examined more closely than others because
such statutes are "constitutionally suspect." ' Thus, the court applied
the strict scrutiny test. The court stated that in order for the statute to
be upheld under equal protection analysis "it must be found that the
racial classifications are necessary to the accomplishment of some
permissible state objective and that the classifications are reasonable
in light of their purpose." 3 Accordingly, the court held that the
statute could not be justified under strict scrutiny analysis because
"[t]he necessity for racial matching ... in adoption to promote the
best interests of the child, and the reasonableness of that racial classification in light of that purpose cannot be sustained"' because given the alternatives to transracial adoption, it could not be said that the
alternatives would prevail over transracial adoption in every case."~
Courts also have applied strict scrutiny to determine whether an
agency policy that takes race into account as a factor in adoptions is
constitutional. 6 These courts have found that racial classifications
are inherently suspect and must therefore survive strict scrutiny analysis to be constitutional. 7 Under strict scrutiny review, a racial classification will be upheld only if it is shown to advance a compelling
state interest and if it is necessary to accomplish that interest?3 Accordingly, the state's responsibility to protect the best interests of a
child in its custody is a compelling state interest."

231. IM. at 268.
232. Id. at 266.
233. Id.; see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Loving v. Virginia,

388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
234. 341 F. Supp. at 268.
235. The court stated that the defendants "do not urge, nor could they successfully do
so, that given the alternatives of institutional life, foster home care or an interracial family
home, the institutional life or foster home care would prevail in all instances over the interracial
family in serving the best interests of the child." Id. at 266.
236. See, e.g., DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp 25, 28-29 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re
R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 784-85 (D.C. 1982); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967).

237. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967).

238. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432-33.
239. See, e.g., DeWees, 779 F. Supp at 28; see also Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433 (stating

that "[tihe goal of granting custody based on the best interest of the child is indisputably a
substantial governmental interest for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause").
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For example, in Drummond v. Fulton County Department of
Family & Children's Services,' the Drummonds, white foster parents, brought an action against the Department of Family &
Children's Services [the "Department"] for refusing to allow them to
adopt Timmy, their mixed race foster child for over two years.
Timmy had been placed with the Drummonds when he was only one
month old.24 The Drummonds had become attached to Timmy and
their care as foster parents had been consistently rated as excellent.u 2 Within a year, they requested permission to adopt him. 3
The Department decided that it would be best to look elsewhere for
an adoptive home for Timmy. Almost one year later, the Drummonds
renewed their request for permission to adopt Timmy.' After a
number of meetings with the Drummonds, the Department held a
final decision-making meeting and denied the Drummonds' request to
adopt Timmy. It was clear that race and the racial attitudes of the
Drummonds were given substantial weight in the decision at the final
meeting. 5
The Drummonds filed suit against the Department claiming that
the Department had denied them equal protection' because of the
extent to which race was considered in denying the Drummonds'
request to adopt Timmy. The trial court found that "race did enter
into the decision of the Department .... [but] that the consideration

of race was properly directed to the best interest of the child and was
not an automatic-type of thing or of placement ...

which would be

prohibited."4 7 The trial court dismissed the Drummonds' suit and
the Drummonds appealed.
The appellate court held that the trial court's holding was not
clearly erroneous because the trial court had found that race was not
the sole determining factor in the Department's decision. Consequently, the appellate court was bound by that finding."8 In so holding,

240. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).

241. Id. at 1203.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.at 1204.

245. Id.
246. The Drummonds' suit against the Department also included claims that the Depart-

ment had deprived the Drummonds and Timmy of their due process rights as protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment by removing Timmy from their home. Id. at 1206-11. For the
purposes of this Note, those claims will not be discussed.

247. Id. at 1204.
248. Id. at 1204-05.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol22/iss4/18

48

Mini: Breaking Down the Barriers to Transracial Adoptions: Can the Mult
1994]

BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS

the appellate court had framed the issue as: "can race be taken into
account, perhaps decisively if it is the factor which tips the balance
between two potential families, where it is not used automatical'
ly?"249
The appellate court held, as in Compos, that the difficulties
inherent in transracial adoption justify the use of race as a relevant
factor in making the decision."
The appellate court's holding relied on a number of factors. One
factor was that the consideration of race in the adoption context suggests no racial slur or stigma about race."' However, consideration
of race in this context is stigmatizing in that it says that "in the most
intimate association of all, family life, it is best that the races should
remain separate." 2 To continue such a stereotype that was eradicated with the invalidation of miscegenation statutes and statutes prohibiting transracial adoption, ignores any progress that has been made in
this country to desegregate the races. Moreover, in cases Where there
are no Black adoptive parents available to adopt the child, it also
says that a Black child should be forced to stay in foster care placements or institutions potentially for the rest of her life rather than be
adopted by a family who loves and cares for her. Since white children are not subjected to this treatment, it says that Black children
are not as deserving of family life as white children.
The Drummond court also considered the fact that the professional literature on transracial adoption stressed the importance of considering the racial attitudes of the prospective parents as a factor. 3
Somehow the court interpreted this to mean that the agency must
consider not only the prospective parents' racial attitudes but also the
prospective parents' race. This suggests that because a person is of
one race, they also have a set of racial attitudes that goes along with
that race. The professional literature requires consideration of the
parents' racial attitudes, not their race. In fact, this means that because a prospective parent is of the same race as the child, that prospective parent has the proper racial attitudes to raise that child. No
such assumption should be made in the context of placing children
for adoption.

249. Id. at 1205.

250. Id. (citing Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972)).
251. Id.
252. Perry, supra note 10, at 78.
253. 563 F.2d at 1205.
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C. In the Best Interests of the Child
The problem in transracial adoptions with respect to the child's
best interests is that there are two competing interests: those of the
particular child to be adopted and those of the Black community as a
whole.' Because these interests are in conflict with one another,
the court must choose which interest to weigh more heavily. Heavier
weighting of the former encourages transracial adoptions whereas
heavier weighting of the latter discourages transracial adoptions. 5
Whenever a court allows the interests of Black society as a whole to
outweigh the interests of an individual Black child, the court abandons the best interests of the child standard and opts for a new approach where the interests of the child are subordinate to the interests
of society. Instead, courts should realize that "[a] child who must
forego parents, whatever their color, is victimized, not benefitted, by
well-intentioned but misdirected attempts to promote racial pride."" 5
Placing the interests of Black society first and prohibiting Black
children from being placed in white homes only further harms Black
society by depriving its next generation of the essential tools necessary to survive in this world. Black society's interests should be
focused on the success of its people, in this case, its children. A
child's likelihood of success is significantly diminished when that
child grows up in foster care, without the support of a devoted family
and a stable home.' Thus, the interests of Black society are not
promoted by prohibiting healthy Black children from being adopted
by white parents only so that they can remain in the foster care system where they are apt to be shuffled from placement to placement

254. See Bowen, supra note 28, at 530 (stating that "children have inextricably intertwined interests both in a stable family and in a cultural identity"); Howard, supra note 33,
at 503-04 ("[C]hildren in need of homes clearly have an identifiable interest in being part of
a stable and permanent family. . . . [H]owever, another important and competing interest
arises-the child's interest in his or her cultural identity as a member of a minority group.");
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 2, at 961 ("Even if transracial placement did threaten Black culture,
the best interests standard does not permit courts and agencies to advance cultural interests at
the expense of an individual child's interests.").
255. Howard, supra note 33, at 504.
256. Shari O'Brien, Race in Adoption Proceedings: The Pernicious Factor, 21 TULsA L.
J. 485, 494-95 (1986).
257. "A recent study of the experiences of youth after foster care in California demonstrated that even among those former foster care youth who might be considered the most
successful, many were 'struggling with ill health, poor education, severe housing, substance
abuse, and criminal behavior."' No PLACE TO CAL. HOME, supra note 86, at 44 (citation

omitted).
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and school to school; to be placed in group homes because of the
lack of available foster homes; to be separated from their siblings;
and to be caused to suffer serious developmental delays and emotional problems. Children who grow up under these conditions will have
difficulty effectively contributing to Black society.
Furthermore, no child should be made to suffer for the "good"
of Black society and culture."s Since it is the individual child who
is most directly and strongly affected by the decision whether or not
to permit a transracial adoption,s 9 the individual child's interests
should be weighted more heavily in the decision. Clearly then, the
child's best interests should be placed ahead of those of society as a
whole, and what is in the best interests of Black children are
homes with parents who love them and care for them, whatever their
color."
The best interests of the child standard has typically been used
in making foster care and adoption placements.6 2 In this context,
the best interests test takes into consideration numerous factors, including: the age of the child and the prospective parents; the stability
of the prospective adoptive family; the reasons the prospective adoptive parents are seeking an adoption; the financial and other resources
of the prospective adoptive family; the existence of love and affection
between the child and the prospective adoptive parents; the blood
relationships, 3 if any, between the child and the prospective adop-

258. See Goodman, supra note 40, at 77 (stating that "[hiarming black children to 'save'
the black community is like destroying a village to save it").
259. Howard, supra note 33, at 533.
260.
No child should be denied what for him are his best interests: the continuity and

stability of an enduring psychological relationship with adult(s); the minimum intervention of the state into his ongoing or emergent family integrity; and the selection

of the alternative which will cause him or her the least harm.
Bowen, supra note 28, at 528 (emphasis added).
261. "There is simply no compelling reason to delay even briefly, for the purpose of
racial matching, placing parentless children in permanent homes. What parentess children

need most are not 'white' parents or 'black' parents or 'yellow' parents but loving parents
able to raise children in a nurturing environment." Kennedy, supra note 7, at A18.
262. See, e.g., In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1322-23 (D.C. 1985).
263. With regard to blood relationships, although some courts find that these relationships
are a factor to be considered, in selecting a placement for a child, see, e.g., In re R.M.G.,

454 A.2d 776, 782 (D.C. 1982), others hold that placement with a family member is presumptively in the best interests of the child, unless there is a showing of good cause to the

contrary or detriment to the child. See, e.g., In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Minn. 1992).
Although there are usually no blood relationships involved in a foster family situation,
foster families have been given greater regard than unrelated individuals by the Supreme
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tive parents; and the race of the child and the prospective adoptive
parents . 2' The difficulty inherent in the application of this standard
is represented by the court in Coles v. Coles:'s
Out of a maze of conflicting testimony, usually including what one
court called 'a tolerable amount of perjury,' the judge must make a
decision which will inevitably affect materially the future life of an
innocent child. In making his decision the judge can obtain little
help from precedents or general principles. Each case stands
alone.... [T]he question for [the trial judge] is what is best for
the child within the limitations presented. When the judge makes his
decision, he has no assurance that his decision is the right one. He
can only hope that he is right. He realizes that another equally able
and conscientious judge might have arrived at a different decision
on the same evidence.2
Because of these difficulties, applying the best interests of the child
standard presents one of the heaviest burdens for a trial judge.s 7
Accordingly, trial judges have traditionally been granted extensive
discretion in the application of this standard,2" with an appellate
court reversing only for an abuse of discretion.'
Race has traditionally been one of the factors considered by the
best interests test. In fact, some courts believe that they have an

Court.
No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship. At least where a child has been placed in foster care
as an infant, has never known his natural parents, and has remained continuously
for several years in the care of the same foster parents, it is natural that the foster
family should hold the same place in the emotional life of the foster child, and
fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural family. For this reason, we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere collection of unrelated individuals.
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977) (footnote omitted)
(noting also that there are important distinctions between foster families and biological
families).
264. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 781. The courts not only consider these factors in terms
of the present, but also in terms of the past and future. Id. For example, even though no
love and affection may exist between the child and the prospective parents because the child
has not been in their care, the court will consider the likelihood that such love and affection
will exist in the future if the prospective parents are permitted to adopt the child.
265. 204 A.2d 330 (D.C. 1964).
266. Id. at 331-32.
267. Id. at 331.
268. See, e.g., In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn. 1992) (stating that "courts have
independent authority to determine a child's 'best interests"').
269. See, e.g., In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 790.
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obligation to consider race as a factor.27 However, consideration of
race has been limited to its consideration as one factor, among many,
in determining the child's best interestsY The court in In re
R.M.G. elaborated on the consideration of race and set out a threestep evaluation for courts to follow: (1) "how each family's race is
likely to affect the child's development of a sense of identity, including racial identity;"272 (2) "how the families compare in this regard;"'' 3 and (3) "how significant the racial differences between the
families are when all the factors relevant to adoption are considered
together." 4 However this three-step approach was severely undercut
by the court in In re D.I.S 5 In that case, the court held that the
three-step approach enunciated by In re R.M.G. was an "unwarranted
and unwise intrusion" into the trial court's discretion in transracial
adoption cases.276 The court stated that it was unwarranted because
270. See, e.g., In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614, 629 (Pa. 1983) (stating that "[a]u reasonable
people look forward to the day when racial prejudice and tension has disappeared; until that
day comes, however, this Court would be remiss in our obligation to determine and further a
child's best interest if we ignored the relevance of race in placement proceedings").
271. In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (stating that "[t]he
difficulties inherent in interracial adoption justify consideration of race as a relevant factor in
adoption, but do not justify race as being the determinative factor"); In re Davis, 465 A.2d
at 625-26 (stating that "[als with all factors, however, the importance of race in a particular
case will vary greatly in accordance with the vast array and unlimited combinations of facts
and circumstances possible in child placement proceedings").
272. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 791. With regard to the first step of the evaluation, the
court stated that the relevant considerations would be:
To what extent would the family expose the child to others of her own race
through the immediate family? Through family friendships? Through the neighborhood? Through school? What other efforts will the family most likely make to
foster the child's sense of identity-including racial and cultural identity--and selfesteem? To what extent has the family associated itself with efforts to enhance
respect for the child's race and culture? To what extent has the family reflected
any prejudice against the race of the child it proposes to adopt?
Il at 792; see also In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d at 786 (stating that a factor to consider
"is the racial attitudes of the prospective couple and whether they could instill and foster a
positive sense of racial identity").
273. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 791. The court noted that in this step of the evaluation,
it "hardly would be surprising" if the prospective parents of the same race as the child were
favored, but it cautioned that prospective parents of a different race may also receive "very
positive ratings." Id. at 792. Accordingly, if the prospective parents of a different race do
well in this part of the analysis, the racial factor may not have the significant or even determinative effect that it would have had, had the different race parents done poorly on this
second step. Id.
274. Id. at 791.
275. 494 A.2d 1316 (D.C. 1985).
276. Id. at 1326-27. The court held that because the three-step approach was not adopted
by any other member of the panel, it was not precedent binding on the In re D.I.S. panel
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there was no need to reach the equal protection issue in transracial
adoption cases, and that it was unwise because it was a sharp departure from the flexible framework for determining the best interests of
the child. 2" Also, the court pointed out that the three-step approach
undermines the best interests standard because it selects out race as a
factor for special consideration under a structured three-step approach.2 18 The concurrence, written by the judge who wrote the
three-step approach in In re R.M.G., disagreed with this aspect of the
opinion and stated that the three-step approach was always required
when race was at issue in an adoption case. 9 The concurrence stated that although the trial judge omitted the three-step approach from
its decision, a reversal was not required because it would not have
effected the result of the case since the trial judge's decision was
heavily influenced by other factors in the case."
The majority in In re D.LS. is correct in stating that requiring a
court to go through a three-step analysis for race, but not for any
other factor, clearly places too much weight on the race factor. For
example, when considering other factors, the court will note "the
prospective adoptive parents are young, they have a stable marriage,
they have adequate financial resources .

. . ."

However, when consid-

ering the factor of race, the court will have to involve itself in an indepth analysis of the inner thoughts of the prospective parents about
race. In doing so, the court unconstitutionally places race in a special
position by saying that it is deserving of more consideration than any
other factor.
The more troubling problem arises where race becomes the controlling factor in the case yet the court masks that fact by referring to
other factors as well in making a decision."8 Although numerous
and therefore, that panel was not compelled to follow it. ME.at 1326.

277. Id. at 1327.
278. Id. The court pointed out that because the three-step approach sets out race for

special consideration, it deflects the focus from the real inquiry, which is determining the
best interests of the child. Id. at 1327 n.18. For example, in this case race was at most a
minimal factor in determining the child's best interests. The trial judge's decision was based

on a number of factors, including the fact that the adoptive parent chosen was the grandmother of the child who would have extensive support from other relatives in the child's
natural family. Also considered was the fact that the foster parents were in the process of a

divorce and that the foster father who had moved out of the home had completely rejected
the child. Id. at 1323-24. Yet, the foster parent, who was of a different race than the child,
argued that the trial judge improperly failed to apply the three-step approach of In re R.M.G.

Id. at 1327 n.18.
279. Id. at 1328 (Ferren, L, concurring).
280. Id.
281. An example of where a court may have masked a race based decision against a
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cases make it clear that race may not be the sole factor in making
placement decisions,' many commentators argue that because the
best interests standard gives great discretion to placement agencies
and courts, that standard has operated to make race a determinative

factor.2" In other words, although courts consider what difficulties
this Black child might face growing up in a white family, they do

not consider two other important considerations: first, the child's
alternatives if she is not adopted by the white foster family' and
second, the potential emotional damage to the child that will be

transracial adoption is Rockefeller v. Nickerson, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1962). In
that case, the Rockefellers alleged that their application to adopt a Black child was rejected
because of an unwritten policy of the Commissioner of Welfare not to accept white parents
as adoptive parents for Black children. Id. at 315. Instead, the court found that the
Rockefellers were not accepted as adoptive parents becau'se of the size of their present family
which already consisted of three natural and two adopted children, the fact that the
Rockefellers were still physically capable of having children of their own, the fact that the
last adopted child had been adopted only a few months before and the fact that Mrs.
Rockefeller intended to continue to work outside the home as a kindergarten teacher. Id.
Despite these facts however, the court never found that the Rockefellers were incapable, physically, emotionally, or financially, of caring for another child. Without a finding that any of
these facts inhibited the ability of the Rockefellers to adopt and care for another child, the
court should not have considered these facts determinative of whether they should be permitted to adopt. Also the court acknowledged that the Assistant Director of Child Welfare discussed with Mrs. Rockefeller her personal views about problems that might arise with regard
to a transracial adoption, id. at 316, hinting at the possibility that the agency thought there
were problems attendant with a transracial adoption about which Mrs. Rockefeller should be
advised.
See Clark, supra note 36, at 27 (stating that "if race is a relevant factor, there is no
reason why it cannot become the deciding factor in any adoption in the hands of a judge
who frames her judgment carefully"); Howard, supra note 33, at 513. See generally
McCormick, supra note 222.
282. For example, in In re Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. 1955), the court stated that
"[t]here may be reasons why a difference in race . . . may have relevance in adoption proceedings. But that factor alone cannot be decisive in determining the child's welfare. It does
not permit a court to ignore all other relevant considerations." Id. at 448.
283. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 10, at 71-72.
Where race is an issue, a general best interests test does not ensure that a court
properly balances a child's need to develop a healthy racial identity along with her
need for a permanent home and a stable relationship with people to whom she has
become attached. As a result, race often has become the dominant consideration,
leading courts to ignore or minimize these other interests of children about which
there is substantial consensus.
Id.
284. This factor should be a very important consideration where the child's only alternative is to be placed with another foster family or in an institutional setting. Clearly, in those
situations, it is in the child's best interests to be adopted by a family of a different race who
wants to adopt the child rather than be transferred from foster family to foster family or
from institution to institution.
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caused by removing her from her foster family.' Furthermore, discretion permits the judge's personal views and biases, with regard to
race, to influence her decision, causing her to overlook other important factors." 6 Or, even more troublesome, discretion may be an invitation to judges to defer to the opinions of social workers on the
assumption that they are more knowledgeable than the judge on the
issue.287
As an alternative, Professor Howard suggests that there should be
a presumption that "should place a checkmark in the same-race
applicants' column, which is then weighed along with the results on
the other factors (e.g., age, economic circumstances, emotional maturity, and stability) in deciding between in-race and cross-race appli' Applying the approach above in considering the best intercants."288
ests of the child, the court will note that the prospective adoptive
parents are young, they are of a different race than the prospective
adoptive child, they have a stable marriage, they have adequate financial resources, etc. In other words, race plays no more of a role than
any other factor in the decision. This approach would protect those
children who have lived with foster parents of a different race who
want to adopt them. Although there would be a checkmark in the
column of the Black prospective adoptive parents for race, there
would be substantially more checkmarks in the column for the white
foster parents for providing care for the child, for loving the child,
and for establishing emotional bonds with the child. If a set of foster
parents did not have this advantage over the new prospective adoptive
parents, then they have proven that they are not the adoptive parents
in the best interests of the child.
The problem with this approach, as with any other approach
short of prohibiting the courts from considering the factor of race, is
that it too, can fall prey to the judge's subjective intent. Thus, a
policy of prohibiting the court from considering the factor of race
seems more attractive, but here too, the judge's subjective intent plays

285. Perry, supra note 10, at 72.

286. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.36 (1977) (stating
that '"judges too may find it difficult, in utilizing vague standards like 'the best interests of

the child,' to avoid decisions resting on subjective values"); Perry, supra note 10, at 79
(stating that "[t]he best interests rule does not encourage even the well-intentioned judge to
be sensitive to the ways in which his own possible biases and assumptions may influence his
decision-making process"); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 2, at 939-40.
287. See Howard, supra note 33, at 530.

288. Id. at 512 n.34.
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a role. If the judge cannot write that race was a factor in his decision, he will find another factor to stress so that he ends up with the
same outcome. Moreover, it is not clear whether or not ignoring the
factor of race would serve the child's best interests either. There will
be some cases where an older child has special needs with regard to
his race. To forbid the court from considering that ehi!d's special
needs would not serve the best interests standard either. Thus, although a policy permitting the use of race as a checkmark might
seem like a solution because it takes the emphasis off of race, it
poses the same problems as any other approach-the court, although
not outright, might place too much weight on the race factor.
Although it is clear that courts may not use race as the determinative factor, this rule was expanded by the holding in In re
Moorehead"9 so that a court could not even rely on an agency
opinion which had been based on race as the determinative factor.
The court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in determining the best interests of the child when it deferred to the agency
that used race as a determining factor in choosing an adoptive home
for a child.2" The facts were as follows. Andrea was born to a
mother who used crack cocaine and abandoned her shortly after
birth. 9' As a result, Andrea was placed in the custody of Montgomery County Children Services Board ["CSB"]. Due to her health,
Andrea was placed on an apnea monitor. Nine days after her birth,
CSB placed Andrea with the Dearths who were instructed how to use
the apnea monitor and how to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
When Andrea was ten months old, the Dearths told CSB that they
wanted to adopt Andrea. Despite evidence that the Dearths would
make a good family for Andrea, CSB discouraged the Dearths and
denied the adoption because the Dearths were white and Andrea was
Black." CSB subsequently asserted additional reasons for its denial
of adoption to the Dearths. However, CSB was unable to substantiate
any of those later reasons. The Dearths were subsequently decertified
as foster parents by CSB.

289.

600 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).

290. Id. at 779-80.
291. Id. at 780.
292. There were numerous factors that should have warranted a placement with the
Dearths. First, they presented evidence of the emotional bonding that had taken place between
Andrea and their family. In addition, they lived in an interracial neighborhood, attended an
interracial church and schools. The Dearths had two of their own children, a stable marriage
and a stable family income. Id. at 785.
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The Dearths filed a motion for review of CSB's actions and for

custody of Andrea. The referee ordered two home studies; one on the
Dearths and the other on the family that CSB had chosen to adopt
Andrea. The results of the studies were divided. The referee denied

the Dearths' motion for custody and recommended that CSB retain
custody of Andrea and that CSB determine who should adopt Andrea.

The trial court adopted the recommendations of the referee. On appeal, the Dearths claimed that CSB chose an adoptive home for

Andrea solely on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that the trial court, in deferring to the CSB, failed to
consider the best interests of the child.293
The appellate court found that there was clear evidence that CSB
had a policy of restricting the adoption of Black children to Black
adoptive parents2' and that such a policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.295 The court held that the trial court

could give no deference at all to CSB's determination since it was
based upon a policy that used race to an unconstitutional extent.2
The court held that the trial court must make its own determination

293. Id. at 779.
294. The court found that an internal memorandum was compelling evidence that CSB
had made at least its initial determination to find a Black couple to adopt Andrea based on
race alone. The memo stated:
The above named child's case was transferred to Adoption on July 27,
1989. At the adoption transfer conference on August 4, 1989 the former caseworker, Chris Mulcahy, shared that Andrea, upon birth and for some time afterward,
child had a very light complexion, which made her appear bi-racial. Mrs. Dearth
also had received some questionable information pertaining to Andrea's parentage.
It is felt that these circumstances possibly influenced the previous caseworker and
Mrs. Dearth to consider that this child would be appropriate for them to keep.
However, by the time the conference was held, Andrea's skin color had deepened
considerably and Chris Mulcahy and the Agency identified this child as black. At
the conference, Ms. Mulcahy stated she felt child should be placed with a black
family, but she did indicate foster parents' interest in adoption.
"On August 7, 1989, I visited the Dearth home, met Andrea and discussed
with Mrs. Dearth our plan to place Andrea with a Black family as soon as one
was identified and that we were currently reviewing homestudies. Mrs. Dearth was
not accepting of this plan, as she repeatedly said she wanted to keep Andrea. Mrs.
Dearth was told that we wanted to place Andrea with a Black couple so that she
could grow up in the same racial and cultural environment."
Id. at 787. The memo prompted the court to state that "Andrea's chances of being adopted
by the Dearths vanished along with her light complexion. As long as the child was regarded
as bi-racial, she was regarded as 'appropriate for . . . (the Dearths] to keep.' Once the child
was revealed as being black, the Dearths were not to be considered." l
295. Id. at 785.
296. Id. at 788.
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of Andrea's best interests and although the trial court may consider
race as a factor, race alone could not outweigh all other factors and
be the determinative factor.2'
This decision is encouraging. It shows that the appellate court
will not only prohibit the trial court from using race as a determinative factor but it will also prohibit the trial court from relying on an
agency's decision that has been made based on race as a determinative factor. Thus, agencies cannot follow discriminatory policies and
expect that the courts will adopt their determination automatically.
In an interesting twist of cases based on the best interests of the
child, in Gloria G. v. Department of Social and Rehabilitative
Services,29 a Black adoptive parent filed a personal injury action on
behalf of her Black adopted child against the Department of Social
and Rehabilitation Services ["SRS"] for damages caused by SRS's
removal of the child from his foster home.299 In part, the claim alleged that SRS caused the child, A., emotional damage in breaching a
duty to protect A.'s best interests by denying A.'s foster family the
possibility of adopting him based on race.3"e SRS did not deny that
race was one of the factors used in selecting adoptive parents for A.,
but argued that it also used other factors in deciding to remove A.
from the home of his foster family.3"' SRS argued that the decision
to remove A. from his foster family was a discretionary act entitled
to immunity.3 °2 A. claimed that SRS was not entitled to immunity

297. •Id. at 785-86, 788.
298. 833 P.2d 979 (Kan. 1992).
299. Id. at 981.

300. Id. at 983. A. claimed that SRS was liable as a governmental entity under KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-6103(a) which provided that "a governmental entity is liable for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees acting within the scope of their employment under the same circumstances that a private person would be liable." Id. at 985.
A.'s claim also alleged that SRS caused A. emotional damage in breaching a duty to

protect A.'s best interests by removing A. from his foster family because of an unsubstantiated report of sexual abuse. Id. at 983. For the purposes of this discussion, this additional

aspect of the case will not be discussed. For the specific facts concerning A.'s history of
placements by SRS, see supra note 115.

301. Id. at 984.
302. Id. SRS claimed immunity under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104 which provided:
A governmental entity or any employee acting within the scope of the
employee's employment shall not be liable for damages resulting from:
(e) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental

entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of the
level of discretion involved.
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because it disregarded a clearly defined standard when it used race as
a controlling factor in making an adoption determination for him.'
Because the court found that SRS did not consider race as the sole
factor in removing A. from his foster family, SRS's decision was a
discretionary act and thus, SRS was immune from liability.'
Although A. was not successful in his suit, the case presents an
interesting concept for other foster children removed from foster parents because of their race. If A. could have proven that SRS had
removed him from his foster family solely because of his race and
that he suffered emotional damages due to that removal, it is likely
that the court may have decided otherwise. The possibility that an
agency might be subjected to a tort action for removing a Black child
from a white foster family solely because of race might deter agencies from making a decision based solely on race. Even if the decision acts only as a deterrent, it nonetheless is encouraging.
IV. THE MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT Acr
A. The Proposed Senate Bill
Prompted in part by a 1989 case in which a Black foster child
was taken away from a white foster family to be placed with a Black
adoptive family which killed the child only a few months later,'
Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Senator Carol Moseley-Braun proposed 3" the Multiethnic Placement Act.3" The purpose of the proposed bill is "to decrease the length of time for children waiting to
be adopted and to prevent discrimination in the placement of children
on the basis of race, color, or national origin. ' ' "NAs originally proposed, the main prohibition of the bill provided that:
[a]n agency, or entity, that receives Federal assistance and is involved in adoption or foster care placements may not delay or deny
the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, or other-

Id at 985; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(e) (1989).
303. Gloria G., 833 P.2d at 985.
304. Id. at 986, 988.
305. See Valdman & Caplan, supra note 8, at 65.
306. As of the date of this writing, Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Senator Carol
Moseley-Braun are joined by Senator Dan Coats, Senator Dave Durenberger, Senator Dianne
Feinstein, Senator Daniel Inouye, Senator Nancy Kassebaun, and Senator Paul Simon as
sponsors of this bill. 140 CoNG. REc. S4037 (1994).
307. S.1224, 103d Cong., IstSess. (1993).
308. S.1224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1993).
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wise discriminate in making a placement decision, solely because of
the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive (or foster) parent
or parents or the child.
As a remedy, the bill provides that the Secretary of Health and Human Resources ("HHR") shall withhold adoption assistance funds
from any covered agency which is not in compliance with the
bill.1 0 Moreover, it provides a private cause of action for any person aggrieved by a covered agency."'
The term "placement decision" is defined by the bill as "the
decision to place, or to delay or deny the placement of a child in a
foster care or adoptive home, and includes the decision of the agency
or entity involved to seek the termination of birth parent rights or
otherwise make a child legally available for adoptive placement."''
The importance of the emphasized section of the definition is essential; in fact, without this definition, the bill would be ineffective to
confront the race matching policies that adoption agencies practice
today. As discussed previously in Part I, adoption agencies often
delay the adoption of a Black child by white parents by failing to
make the child available for adoption until there is a Black adoptive
family available to adopt the child."' At that point, which could be
years after the child was initially placed with the foster family, the
child would be placed with the Black family due to the consideration
of race as a factor." 4 Under this bill, however, even delaying the
decision to make a child available for adoption is prohibited." 5
Thus, a child will not wait in foster care, developing bonds with his
foster care family, only to be taken away from that family years later
when a same race adoptive family is finally found. Each child will
309. S. 1224, 103d Cong., 1st Ses. § 3(a)(1) (1993) (emphasis added).
310. S. 1224, 103d Cong., IstSeass. § 3(b) (1993).
311. S. 1224, 103d Cong., IstSeass. § 3(c) (1993).
312. S. 1224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (a)(3) (1993) (emphasis added).
313. By failing to make a child legally available for adoption, agencies protect themselves against discrimination claims by white prospective adoptive parents asserting that they
were denied the right to adopt the child because of the difference in race. The agencies'
defense is that the white parents were denied that opportunity because the child was not free
for adoption. However, upon freeing the child for adoption when a Black family becomes
available, the agency can use the added factor of race to match the child with the Black

adoptive family, without being subject to suit by the white family for failing to permit them
to adopt the child.
314. For a discussion of the case law and statutes that have made it permissible to consider race as a factor in placements, see supra part 111.
315. In this respect, the bill provides advantages over its state counterparts that do not
offer this type of protection from discrimination. See supra part MI.A.2.
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have the right to be placed with a permanent family within a reasonable period of time, even if the agency has been unable to locate a
Black adoptive family.
Furthermore, under the bill, race, color, or national origin may
only be a consideration if (1) it is relevant to the best interests of the
child and (2) it is considered in conjunction with other factors.316
Senator Metzenabum's remarks when he'introduced the bill made his
intent clear. He stated:
I believe that same race placement is always desirable, if possible
and if the prospective parents are appropriate? 7 For that reason
my bill states that race, national origin or color may be one of
many factors to consider in determining the placement that is in the
best interest of the child. However, my bill will also make it clear
that race, national origin, or color cannot be the only consideration
in making foster care and adoptive placements. Policies prohibiting
racial and ethnic mixing have no place in determining what is in
the best interests of any child."'
After being sent to the Labor and Human Resources Committee,
the bill was reported favorably.319 However, it had been substantially
amended."e The main prohibition in the new bill stated as follows:
[a]n agency, or entity, that receives Federal assistance and is involved in adoption or foster care placements may not(A) categorically deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent, solely on the basis of the
race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent,
or the child, involved; or
(B) unduly delay or deny the placement of a child for adop*

316. S. 1224, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(2) (1993).

317. 139 CoNG. REC. S8707-02, 58713 (1993). It appears that in this area, most cornmentators start with the unproven premise that same race placement is always preferred if it
is available. But see Charles Fried, Limits on Transracial Adoption Hurt Children: No To
Race Preferences, N.Y. Tuam, Dec. 8, 1993, at A24 (In response to an article about

transracial adoption, Fried states "you go on to repeat the canard that 'clearly, matching
adoptive parents with children of the same race is a good idea.' Why is this so clear? Lurking behind this unproven assumption is the same logic that held that 'clearly' blacks and
whites should serve in segregated military units.") However, one can easily imagine a case
where although there are suitable Black adoptive parents, there are also potential white adop-

tive parents who, because of a number of factors to be considered, are in the best interests
of the child. In fact, in these cases, it seems that the best interests of the child standard is
displaced by the notion that a child should be placed with a parent of the same race.

318. 139 CONG. REc. S8707-02, S8713 (1993).
319. 139 CONo. REc. D1096 (1993).
320. S. 1224, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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tion or into foster care, or othervise discriminate in making a
placement decision, solely on the basis of the race, color, or
national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child,
involved. 21

Nowhere in the bill is the term "unduly delay" defined. What

exactly does it mean to "unduly delay"? Does it mean to delay for
six months, one year, two years, or more? To those who support
transracial adoption, a delay of even one month could be considered

undue, especially if there is a white family available to adopt the
child.3 ' By contrast, however, to those who oppose transracial adoption, any period of time that a child waits for a Black adoptive home
would not be an undue delay, even if that meant a period of three or
more years. The bill, as amended by the Committee, implicitly permitted agencies to take significant delays in placing Black children in
adoptive homes by failing to limit the period of time an agency can

delay an adoption by a white family when there is no Black adoptive
family available.3z
It can reasonably be assumed that those who amended the bill in
the Committee were concerned that only an undue delay should be
prohibited because some type of administrative delay is always neces-

321. S. 1224, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(1) (1994).
322. See, e.g., BARTHOLEr, supra note 4, at 112 (stating that "[n]o delays in placement,
whether for six months or one month, should be tolerated in the interest of ensuring a racial
match . . . . Any preference for same-race placement that causes delay or that otherwise
threatens the interest of the children involved should be viewed as unlawful racial discrimination"); Kennedy, supra note 7, at A18 (stating that "[t]here is simply no compelling reason
to delay even briefly, for the purpose of racial matching, placing parentless children in permanent homes").
323. For criticisms of the amended version of the bill, see All in the Family, supra note
100, at 6 (stating that "[ulnfortunately, as currently written, the bill will do little to change
the essential nature of current practices"); Elizabeth Bartholet, Race Separatism Bill Is a Big
Mistake, SAN FRANcISCO CHRON., Nov. 4, 1993, at A25 (stating that "[if Congress is to act
at all, it should eliminate rather than endorse race matching"); Elizabeth Bartholet, Adoption
is About Family, Not Race, Cm. TRu., Nov. 5, 1993, at N23 (stating that "[tihe bill in its
current form would make things worse, not better, for Black children held in foster care by
validating the kind of racial matching policies now considered legally and politically suspee"); Elizabeth Bartholet, Limits on TransracialAdoption Hurt Children, N.Y. TimmS, Dec.
8, 1993, at A24 [hereinafter Bartholet, Limits on TransracialAdoption] (stating that "[tihis
version endorses race matching, prohibits only 'undue' delay, and would permit social workers to choose 'long-term foster care' in preference to adoption"); Goodman, supra note 40, at
77 (stating that "[a] move that promised change authorizes and legitimizes the very racial
matching that would keep foster children in place"); Kennedy, supra note 7 ("At present,
there exists no congressional authorization for race matching, much less for any delay in
child placements for purposes of racial matching. If this bill is enacted, there will exist congressional authorization for both.").
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sary so that the agency can find suitable adoptive parents. Clearly,
there must have been a concern that, without an allowance for some
delay, agencies might be forced to make lifetime decisions for a child
in a short period of time where possibly no qualified parents were
available, thereby compromising the best interests of the child. There
must have been some uncertainty as to what the term "delay" was to
mean; but instead of defining that term, the Committee simply replaced it with another undefined term. By amending the bill to prohibit an undue delay without defining that term, the Committee failed
to address one of the primary purposes of the bill-the term "unduly
delay" does not proscribe the continued use of the delaying practices
used by adoption agencies. Instead, the bill implicitly permits the
continuance of these practices.
The Committee should have defined the term "unduly delay" as
a definite period of time so that it could not be interpreted to mean
two, three, or more years. For example, the Committee should have
defined "unduly delay" to mean that the agency cannot delay any
placement decision for a period of more than twelve months. Such a
time period balances the competing interests involved in transracial
adoptions by providing ample time for the agency to find Black
adoptive parents if such parents are available, while enabling a child
to become a member of a permanent family within a reasonable period of time. Instead, the Committee chose to avoid defining "unduly
delay," leaving it to the courts to decide on a case by case basis as
suits are brought under the statute or to the regulation of the Department of Health and Human Services.
Senator Metzenbaum recognized the problem with the new
bill . .4 and quickly responded by proposing another amendment to
the bill which would leave the second version of the bill untouched
except for the removal of the word "unduly" from section
3(a)(1)(B). 325 In his statement, Senator Metzenbaum acknowledged:
The lack of definition for the term "unduly delay" in S. 1224
has caused some concern among the foster care and adoption community. Some who otherwise support S. 1224, fear that the term

324. The addition of the word "unduly" to the amended version of the bill caused the
bill to receive substantial criticism. For example, Professor Randall Kennedy wrote that "[tfhe
Multiethnic Placement Act is thus an egregious example of legislative consistency. Its aim is
to decrease the length of time that children wait to be adopted. Yet it expressly permits
delay for the purpose of racial matching, prohibiting only undue delay." Kennedy, supra note
7, at A18.
325. 140 CONG. Rnc. S4037 (1994).
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"unduly" will not or cannot be defined in a manner consistent with

the goals of the bill. In order to make it clear that appropriate out
of home placements should be made as soon as possible, the latest
version of S. 1224 has eliminated the term "unduly."'3"

Despite the fact that Senator Metzenbaum's new amendment was
intended to rest6re the integrity of the bill, the proposed bill as cur-

rently proposed, is still insufficient to cure all the ills that have
plagued adoption and foster care placements. Although at first it

appears that the bill will be able to eradicate the holding policies that
force children to stay in the foster care system for years, it is likely
that the bill will have no such effect. Like the lack of definition for

the term "unduly delay" in the previous version of the bill, the lack
of definition for the term "delay" presents the same problems. Unless
the bill defines what length of time constitutes a "delay," the holding

policies will remain in effect. 27 The agencies will claim that the
delays they are encountering are only administrative delays which are
necessary to comply with finding a placement which is in the best
interests of the child. Because the holding policies are not articulated

by the agency, it is even more difficult to prevent their use and thus,
firmer guidelines are necessary to prohibit them.s
According to Senator Metzenbaum's office, the Department of
Health and Human Services will set and enforce guidelines for how

long an agency may wait in making a placement. 2 However, the

326. Id.
327. In fact, even if the bill were amended to change the term "delay" to "minimal
delay," it would still be insufficient to combat the discriminatory practices in adoption placements. An agency could argue, that in light of the importance of making the best appropriate
placement for a child, a delay of two or three years is still a minimal delay. In every case,
the agencies would argue that these substantial delays are only minimal. Thus, the only way
to avoid these discriminatory practices is to specifically limit the period of time that an agency may wait before making an adoption placement. Without such a specified period of time,
the agencies will continue to argue that the delays are in the best interests of the child despite the fact that studies show that a permanent placement, as soon as possible, is in the
best interests of the child.
328. The holding policies that the agencies follow are not open policies. In other words,
the agency workers follow these policies because they know its part of their job to do so
but the policies are not written down. Because of this, proving that an agency delayed a
child's placement will be nearly impossible unless a former agency worker was to testify that
these policies existed or statistics were able to show that these policies existed. Statistics
would have to show that, in cases where foster parents expressed an interest in adopting their
foster child, there was a lower percentage of Black foster children adopted by their white
foster parents than there were by their Black foster parents.
329. Rosin, supra note 85, at 85A (quoting Gail Lacider, an aide to Senator
Metzenbaum).
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Department has a longstanding policy of ignoring its own rules for
adoption placements.3" For example, the Department has never enforced its rule requiring the Department to monitor adoptable foster
care children every six, twelve and eighteen months.33 Thus, given
the longstanding failure to monitor the problem at hand, the Senate's
reliance on the Department is irresponsible. In order to effectively
eradicate discrimination in child placements, Congress must set down
the guidelines for how long an agency may wait before it is considered to be "delaying" a placement decision.
The bill should have clearly defined the term "delay," in the
context of making an adoption placement or a decision to make a
child legally available for adoption. Delay should mean "failing to
make a placement within twelve months." Although a twelve month
limit is an arbitrary period of time, such a time period balances the
competing interests involved: it affords the child the security of
knowing that a placement cannot be postponed for an indeterminate
period of time; it provides the natural parent with guidelines for planning to be reunited with the child; and it instructs the agency of the
sufficient length of time to seek out a placement.
Under such a revised bill, an agency would only have one year
to hold a Black child in foster care while it seeks out Black adoptive
parents. After one year, the agency would have to make the child
available for adoption regardless of whether or not Black adoptive
parents are available. If the agency believed that parental rights
should not be terminated at this point, then, rather than keep the child
in foster care for an indeterminate period of time, the agency would
have to make a plan to reunite the child with her parent(s). Of
course, there would have to be an exception for those situations
where the agency decides that parental rights should not be terminated while also deciding that the child should not be reunited with her
natural parent(s) at this time. This exception, however, should be used
only in very limited circumstances and the facts surrounding the
exception should be critically examined by the court.332 This would
set down firm guidelines for agencies to follow and at the same time
result in a permanent placement for the child.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. For example, this exception might apply where the child's natural parent is in a
drug rehabilitation program and although the natural parent is not yet ready to have the child
returned after one year, neither should the natural parent's rights be terminated, since there is
a likelihood that the natural parent will be rehabilitated and will be reunited with the child.
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With regard to making foster care placements, the term "delay"
should be defined to mean "failing to make a placement within three
months." As the role of foster care has changed from temporary care
to long term care that often results in adoption, agencies are beginning to look more carefully at the placements they choose from the

outset. Thus, agencies are becoming increasingly reluctant to place
Black children in white foster homes because they fear the consequences if the white parents decide they want to adopt the child. The

alternative to placing a child in a foster care home is to leave the
child in an institutional setting. Because the institutional setting can
be so damaging to the child, and in light of the fact that foster care

placements are not necessarily permanent, agencies should be forced
to place children in foster care homes as quickly as possible. Of

course, this three month period would allow the agency sufficient
time to ensure that the placement is in the child's best interest.
That the bill permits race to be a determinative factor where
there are both Black and white prospective adoptive parents available
is also troublesome.333 Under the current law, Title VI of the Civil

333. Senator Metzenaburn made it clear that where there are two appropriate families,
one Black and one white, the intent of the bill is to make race a determinative factor. 140
CONG. REc. S4037 (1994). At the introduction of the amendment, the following exchange
took place:
Mr. COATS.... I would like to ask for clarification of one section in the
bill that states that a covered agency may consider race, color, or national origin
as a factor in making placement decisions if it is relevant to the best interests of
the child involved and is considered in conjunction with other factors. Does the
Senator intend that this section allow the use of race, color, or national origin as a
determining factor between two otherwise appropriate and available families, when
to do so is in the best interests of the child? The reason I am asking this question
is that the bill also prohibits denial of adoption based on race. This appears to be
a contradiction.
Mr. MEIZENBAUM. . . . [The intent is to allow race to be considered as
one of many factors and to allow race to be the determinative factor between two
otherwise appropriate and available families, if and only if the consideration of
race is in the child's best interest.
Mr. COATS. So, I gather from the Senator's response that the primary
concern of this bill is the child's best interest.
Mr. METZENBAUM. That is correct ....
Id. Unfortunately, one can easily imagine a case where white foster parents have raised a
Black child since her infancy only to find that when she becomes available for adoption,
presumably within a reasonable period of time, Black adoptive parents are available for her.
In such a case, race will be a determinative factor and the child will be placed with the
Black adoptive parents, despite the fact that the child may already view her white foster
parents as "psychological parents." See GowsmI ET AL., supra note 60, at 98. It does not
appear that the bill would make any improvements for Black children in this type of situation, except that it may force the agency to speed up the process so that this whole scenario
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Rights Act prohibits discrimination by public and private adoption
agencies that receive federal funds. The guidelines for Title VI provide that race may be used as a factor in making adoption and foster
care placements, but that it cannot be a determinative factor.3"4 The
fact that race may be the determinative factor puts the bill in direct
conflict with cases,335 state statutes,336 and Title VI's guidelines,337 all of which expressly provide that race may not be the determinative factor in making a child placement. Thus, the irony is that

by allowing race to be a determinative factor, the Senate bill actually
does a disservice to Black children in the foster care system-it diminishes the effect of state court decisions and statutes that have pro-

tected Black children by prohibiting race from being used as a determinative factor in making their placement decisions.
Thus, despite Congressional action to improve the state of
transracial adoptions, the standards for agency placement decisions

will remain uncertain and therefore, subject to litigation. The weight
race plays in the placement decision will again be determined by the
subjective mind of a judge; such a discretionary standard is not acceptable.33 Moreover, the legislative history of the proposed Senate
bill indicates clearly that so long as a preference statute establishes a
system consistent with the best interests of the child, the bill would

not prohibit the policy.339 Consequently, no sooner than Congress
may take place within a year or two as compared to the two or more years that it takes
today.
334. Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1230 (citing Memorandum from David Chavkin, Deputy
Director for Program Development, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to Virginia Apodoca, Region X Director of the Office of Civil Rights (Jan. 19, 1981)).
335. See, e.g., In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ('The factor
of race alone cannot outweigh all other considerations and be the determinative or decisive
factor. In other words, considerations of race may not dominate the decision to the exclusion
of other considerations.").
336. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727(c)(3) (West 1993) (The court "shall
not disapprove any adoption under this section solely because of ...
a difference in race,
color, or religion between a prospective adopting parent and the child to be adopted").
337. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
338. See Eubanks, supra note 165, at 1257-59 (arguing that similar problems plagued the
legislation in Texas which was intended to eliminate the use of race as a primary factor in
adoption placements).
339. The following exchange took place in the Senate with regard to the Minnesota
preference statute.
MR. DURENBERGER. . . . Minnesota has a policy, absent good cause to
the contrary, of first attempting to place the child with relatives. If that is not
workable, the State agency attempts to place the child with a family of the same
racial or ethnic heritage. If that is not feasible, the final preference is for a family
of different heritage that knows and appreciates the child's racial and ethnic hei-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol22/iss4/18

68

Mini: Breaking Down the Barriers to Transracial Adoptions: Can the Mult

1994]

BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS

enacts such a bill, there will be a manifest need for statutory reform.
Despite the bill's problems, "[w]ith little fanfare and no recorded
vote," the Senate adopted the Multiethnic Placement Act as an
amendment to another bill just after 1 A.M. on a Saturday.' The
bill is currently awaiting approval in the House of Representatives.
B. The Proposed House Bill
After the proposal of the Multiethnic Placement Act in the Senate, Representative Luis Guiterrez proposed a similar bill in the
House of Representatives." The main prohibition under H.R. 3307
states:
[i]n determining the placement of a child for foster care or adoption, in a case in which an individual of the same race, color, or
national origin as the child is not available to be the parent of the
child, an entity that receives Federal assistance may not give greater
weight to any difference between the race, color, or national origin
of the child and that of any prospective parent of the child than the
entity gives to any other factor used in determining the best interests of the child.
The problem with this version of the bill is that it does not define
what it means by "a case in which an individual of the same race,
color, or national origin as the child is not available." It does not
address how long an agency may wait for parents of the same race to
become available. Does it mean that an agency can wait five years
until a family of the same race comes along and then give the child
to the family of the same race? The problem does not lie when the
child becomes available for adoption, it begins long before. The holding policies which the agencies use to keep Black children from
becoming available for adoption are the problem that needs to be
addressed. The purpose of enacting this bill is defeated if it can be
interpreted to allow an agency to "hold" a child for years until a

tage. The search for relatives or families of similar race and ethnicity must be

completed within a short and specified time period.
Would the Multiethnic Placement Act prevent a State from implementing

such a policy of preferences?
Mr. MEITZNBAUM. Consistent with the best interests of the child, the bill
would not prevent such policies.

140 CONG. REc. S4037 (1994).
340. Koenig, supra note 6, at 3A.

341. H.R. 3307, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
342.

H.R. 3307, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
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Black family becomes available.
The House bill does not provide a solution to the problem. The
problem that most often arises is that minority children are placed
with non-minority foster families for a substantial period of time and
when the families wish to adopt the children, the agency stalls the
adoption while it searches for minority parents. The bill provides that
when an individual of the child's race, color, or national origin is not
available, the agency, in examining factors, may not give greater
weight to any difference between the race, color, or national origin of
the child and that of any prospective parent of the child. Clearly, this
bill provides that in a situation where no Black parent is available,
the agency may not discriminate against the potential white parent.
However, the bill does not provide any time frame during which the
agency may search for a parent of the same race, color, or national
origin. Thus, if the agency is permitted to take years to find adoptive
parents, there can potentially be parents of the child's race, color or
national origin available in every case.
The House bill protects the interests of Black children even less
than the Senate bill. It does not recognize the fact that children need
protection from agencies who hold up their adoptions simply because
that adoption might involve a family of a different race. Although the
problem does exist at the foster care and adoption stage, it must be
attacked at its root, the decision to make the child available for adoption. Children do not need protection in cases where parents of the
same race do not exist because the agencies will forbid those cases
from ever arising by tying the child up in the red tape of waiting to
be made legally available for adoption. Without a time limit for making these children available for adoption, the statutory protection the
bill provides will be circumvented and ultimately irrelevant.
C. Public Reactions to the Proposed Bills
Despite the fact that the bill explicitly states that affirmative
efforts are needed to recruit adoptive parents of every race, members
of the NABSW have condemned the Senate bill, saying that it will
make it harder to recruit Black families to adopt Black children. 3
They assert that the "bill is camouflaged as a 'multiethnic' adoption
initiative, but it's really designed to help white families adopt black

343. Koenig, supra note 6, at 3A.
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children." 3' They promise to block the passage of the Multiethnic
Placement Act in the House of Representatives.'
Similarly, dozens of law professors condemn the bill, although
their reasons differ from the NABSW's. 3' They assert that the "bill,
by continuing to allow race to be considered as one factor, will perpetuate a 'new racism' that now allows some social-service agencies
to prevent or delay transracial adoptions.""37 They contend that the
bill is an example of legislative inconsistency because on the one
hand, its aim is to prevent discrimination on the basis of race, color,
or national origin in placement decisions while on the other hand, it
permits an agency to consider race as a factor in these placement
decisions." They note that, "[a]t present, there exists no congressional authorization for race matching, much less for any delay in
child placements for purposes of racial matching. If this bill is enacted, there will exist congressional authorization for both."' 3 9 To ad-

vance their position, the professors have sent a letter to Congress
urging
it to reject the bill as "unwise, intolerable and unconstitution350
al.,
V.

CONCLUSION

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act currently prohibits discrimination
by public adoption agencies and private adoption agencies which
receive federal funds.35 The Multiethnic Placement Act, although it
has enormous potential, is no more than a restatement of the current
federal law under Title VI. Even Senator Metzenbaum, for whom
passage and enactment of the Act is the highest legislative priority,352 has acknowledged that the Act merely restates Title VI. If Title VI has not afforded Black children any protection from discriminatory agency practices, there is no reason to believe that the Multiethnic Placement Act would afford such protection. In fact, if passed,
the Multiethnic Placement Act will only diminish the limited

344. Id. (quoting Johnny White, a member of the NABSW's adoption panel).

345. Il
346. Bartholet, Limits on TransracialAdoption, supra note 323, at A24; Kennedy, supra
note 7, at A18; Koenig, supra note 6, at 3A.
347. Koenig, supra note 6, at 3A.
348. Kennedy, supra note 7, at A18.
349. Id.
350. Bartholet, Limits on TransracialAdoption, supra note 323, at A24.
351. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
352. 140 CONG. REc. S4037 (1994).
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protections that the states and the federal guidelines have provided to
Black children by prohibiting race from being a determinative factor
in making placement decisions.
The bill should be rejected because if Congress is going to acknowledge that discrimination in foster care and adoption placements
is taking place, then the Black children of this country deserve more
than merely a restatement of a law which has provided them no
protection in the past. What they need now is protection from child
placing agencies that believe if Black adoptive families are not available, it is better for Black children to sit in institutions or be shuffled
from foster home to foster home than to have a permanent home with
a white family. The bill, as passed in the Senate, provides no protection to Black children from these practices. In fact, the agencies that
abide by these policies acknowledge that the bill, if passed, will have
little effect on their procedures.353 Therefore, it should be rejected.
In contrast to those who would rather leave a child in limbo
than place them with a white family, others encourage transracial
adoption as a viable alternative and even believe that transracial adoption may have its own unique advantages. I agree. Most importantly,
I believe that mixing the races can only promote more understanding
between the races, thereby eradicating the ignorance that causes racism in society today.
Michelle M. Mini

353. In Missouri and Illinois, where state agencies consider race as one factor when
matching a child to an adoptive family, officials do not expect the bill to have a major
impact on the states' policies. Koenig, supra note 6, at 3A.
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